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The present document comprises the manuscripts „Reconsidering the ‚relative’ in 
relative ingroup prototypicality“ and “Attitude ambivalence or statistical artifact? 
Multivariate constructs require multivariate analyses”, both of which have been submitted to 
peer-reviewed psychological journals. While each manuscript is self-contained and deals with 
a separate area of substantive research, the methodological critique and proposal is identical. 
This introduction distills and integrates the methodological aspects of these manuscripts and 
was written for the reader who is going to read (or has read) both manuscripts. In the 
following, I will summarize the methodological argument underlying both manuscripts and 
point to other constructs in social psychology where it also applies. 
Statistical treatment of multivariate constructs in social psychology 
 The main goals of the present work are to identify confounds resulting from the 
current practice of analyzing multivariate constructs as index variables and to suggest an 
alternative procedure that avoids these confounds. Therefore, I begin by explaining the 
concepts confounds, multivariate constructs and index variables, which are central to my 
argument. 
Confounds 
According to its Latin roots (confundere), the verb to confound literally means to pour 
together, mingle, mix, and figuratively, it means to make indistinct or unrecognizable (Glare, 
1969). Psychologists typically use the term confound in causal inference situations. For 
instance, the so-called “Mozart effect” (Rauscher, Shaw, & Ky, 1993) – enhanced spatial-
temporal performance after exposure to music composed by Mozart – has been  criticized for 
confounding Mozart music with participants’ preferences. For participants who prefer a short 
story by Stephen King over Mozart, the “Mozart effect” does not obtain after exposure to 
Mozart music but after exposure to the King story (Nantais & Schellenberg, 1999). As this 
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example shows, confounds call into question the label of an effect, creating a threat to the 
validity of the conclusions that researchers draw from their research. Confounds often arise in 
quasi-experiments, and it is well known how they can be eliminated or reduced in scope by 
experimental design or statistical analysis (e.g., Reichardt, 2006; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 
2002). 
Likewise, confounds arise at the more basic step of measuring psychological 
constructs. The very idea of measurement implies unidimensionality (Thurstone, 1928). In 
the context of psychological measurement, confounds refer to construct-irrelevant 
contamination such as socially desirable responding (e.g., Paulhus, 2001). As in causal 
inference situations, it is well known how measurement confounds can be eliminated or 
reduced in scope either by measurement design, or by explicitly modeling the relationship 
between a construct and a measure as in latent variable modeling, or by statistically 
controlling for the confound if it is known.  
In contrast, the confounds addressed by my work must be called more fundamental for 
two different reasons. First, they would still threaten the validity of a researcher’s conclusions 
even if the researcher were to dispose of perfectly unidimensional measures and the causal 
nature of the relationships between the constructs under investigation were beyond doubt. 
Second, as will become clear in the next section, the confounds discussed below are also 
more consistent with the literal meaning of pouring together different things. But of course 
they share with the confounds mentioned above the basic implication for the conduct of 
science: They call into question the validity of a label for an effect (or more generally, 
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Multivariate constructs 
The confounds discussed below can arise in the study of multivariate constructs. For 
present purposes, I call multivariate constructs those constructs that locate a person (or any 
unit of analysis) in a psychological space defined by more than one dimension (although 
measures of each dimension may be truly unidimensional). This definition includes the 
constructs of relative ingroup prototypicality (RIP, Manuscript #1) and attitude ambivalence 
(AA, Manuscript #2) but is clearly broad enough to invite a closer look at other social 
psychological constructs that I did not specifically investigate but will briefly discuss below.  
RIP is a multivariate construct because it positions a person in psychological space 
according to his or her judgments about the typicality of an ingroup and an outgroup. RIP is 
assumed to increase to the extent that an ingroup is associated with higher prototypicality for 
a superordinate social category that is shared with the outgroup, and to the extent that the 
outgroup is associated with lower prototypicality for the superordinate category 
(Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003). For 
instance, it has been found that Germans’ attitudes toward people from Eastern European 
countries are less positive, the more they perceive Germans to be relatively more prototypical 
for Europeans in general than Eastern Europeans (Ullrich, Christ, & Schlüter, 2006).  
AA is a multivariate construct because it positions a person according to his or her 
degree of positivity and negativity toward an attitude object. AA is assumed to increase to the 
extent that (among other things) positivity and negativity toward the attitude object increase 
(Kaplan, 1972; Priester & Petty, 1996; Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995). For instance, a 
central theme of 80’s and 90’s research on intergroup relations in the United States was the 
notion that many European Americans hold ambivalent attitudes toward African Americans. 
According to Katz and Hass (1988), many European Americans feel sympathy with African 
Americans as a group that has been and continues to be discriminated against, but they also 
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blame them for not doing enough to help themselves. These dual perceptions are assumed to 
derive from the conflicting ideologies of humanitarianism-egalitarianism and the 
individualistic Protestant work ethic.  
Index variables of multivariate constructs 
It is a natural tendency of language to reify and simplify empirical observation. In 
scientific language, it is doubtlessly convenient and justifiable to talk about RIP or AA as if it 
– note the singular form – could be “more” or “less” or “higher” or “lower”, or as if it could 
influence (or be influenced by) other entities. However, the crux of this practice is that 
researchers can easily be led into thinking that what is singular and univariate in scientific 
language may (or even must) be translated into a single numerical index, as is documented by 
the literature cited in Manuscripts #1 and #2. 
The history of index numbers in the social sciences begins with the practice of 
averaging across prices of different commodities to index price changes (Stigler, 1999, 
Chapter 3). Index numbers were only reluctantly admitted into the social sciences. The 19th 
century economists asked: “what meaning could an average price possibly have when each 
and every price carried with it a set of special circumstances, excuses, or causes for its 
peculiar behavior?” (Stigler, 1999, p. 73) Today, index numbers are widely accepted 
throughout the social sciences. One need only browse the journal Social Indicators Research, 
for example, to find a cornucopia of indices of any conceivable aspect of societies. One 
recently proposed index of violence and harm in the United States consists of the geometric 
mean of the percent change of homicides, suicides, substance abuse deaths, and other things, 
relative to a baseline (Brumbaugh-Smith, Gross, Wollman, & Yoder, in press).  
There is nothing wrong with using such an index in order to, for instance, trace 
violence and harm across time, as long as one is content with not knowing specifically what 
changes or stays the same: Homicides, suicides, and/or substance abuse deaths? However, I 
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would argue that researchers can rarely (if ever) be content with not knowing if the things 
they “pour together” behave in the way the choice of their index suggests. The violence and 
harm index tells us the rate of change in homicides, suicides, substance abuse deaths, et 
cetera, if all these things were changing at the same rate, but it does not tell us if they are. 
Researchers usually make careful theoretical choices when constructing their index variable, 
be it a mean, a difference as in research on RIP (see Manuscript #1), or a more complicated 
composite index as in research on AA (see Manuscript #2). These choices are valuable – the 
index is not. The problem with statistical analyses involving commonly used indices of RIP 
and AA is very simple: Results are ambiguous with regard to the conceptual hypothesis (e.g., 
RIP influences outgroup attitudes or AA moderates attitude effects). The solution to the 
problem is equally simple: The assumptions that would enter into a given index must be 
spelled out as a multivariate model. No index need be constructed. As Meehl remarked in a 
different context:”[O]ne should initially disaggregate, leaving open the possibility of 
reaggregation if the subdivision turns out not to matter; whereas if one begins by aggregation, 
one may be throwing away important information that is not recapturable.” (Meehl, 1997, p. 
394) 
Other multivariate constructs in social psychology 
The foregoing definition of multivariate constructs applies to a whole range of 
constructs that are perhaps more mainstream than RIP and AA. My focus on RIP and AA 
owes to my personal interest in the ideas that the quality of intergroup relations depends on 
the definition of a superordinate prototype (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) and that attitudes 
vary on a strength dimension that is often orthogonal to the valence dimension (Petty & 
Krosnick, 1995). In this section, I briefly discuss other contructs where my methodological 
argument applies with the same force: ingroup bias, and prevention and promotion focus. 
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Ingroup bias 
The construct of ingroup bias – preferential treatment or evaluation of an ingroup 
relative to an outgroup – arguably is one of social psychology’s dearest constructs. An 
internet search for articles mentioning the term “ingroup bias” (conducted with Google 
Scholar on May 27th, 2007) produced more than one thousand results. As a result of the 
fruitfulness of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) for generating hypotheses 
about its conditions and effect-size factors, ingroup bias has often assumed the status of a 
dependent variable. The variable is typically constructed by subtracting outgroup evaluations 
from ingroup evaluations, such that scores greater than zero represent a preference for the 
ingroup. The implicit assumption underlying a difference score as dependent variable is that 
the independent variable has equal but opposite effects on the components of the difference 
score. However, when a single variable is used to index ingroup bias, it is impossible to test if 
the independent variable has a positive (or negative) effect on ingroup evaluations and a 
negative (or positive) effect on outgroup evaluations that is of the same absolute magnitude. 
A discussion of a more appropriate multivariate approach to testing these hypotheses can be 
found in Edwards (1995). 
It is interesting to note that research on ingroup bias has been influenced only 
minimally by reviews indicating that ingroup and outgroup evaluations are not reciprocally 
related (at least in the absence of a realistic conflict), and that consistent effects of the factors 
typically studied in the minimal group paradigm can only be observed for ingroup 
evaluations (Brewer, 1979, 1999). The use of difference scores – which confound effects of 
or on ingroup and outgroup evaluations – persists even in Brewer’s own work (e.g., 
Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001). A simple explanation of this form of scientific inertia (which 
parallels the modest resonance of Cohen’s power studies, see Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989) 
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would be that the practice of constructing index variables of multivariate constructs 
constitutes a well-learned habit that is nurtured by tradition. 
Implicit prejudice 
Consider a related debate about a modern variant of the ingroup bias construct, i.e. 
implicit prejudice as measured via the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, 
& Schwartz, 1998). Blanton and colleagues (Blanton, Jaccard, Christie, & Gonzales, 2007; 
Blanton, Jaccard, Gonzales, & Christie, 2006) bring essentially the same arguments as above 
to bear on the validity of the IAT score, which is based on the difference of reaction times 
from different experimental conditions. Proponents of the IAT do not agree with their 
criticism (Nosek & Sriram, 2007). Consistent with my habit interpretation, their first 
counterargument refers to the widespread use of d', the established sensitivity measure 
derived from Signal Detection Theory (Green & Swets, 1966). This measure is calculated by 
subtracting the z-score that corresponds to the false-alarm rate from the z-score that 
corresponds to the hit rate in a signal detection task. However, without further assumptions, 
the correlation between false-alarm rates and hit rates can vary considerably (O'Toole, 
Bartlett, & Abdi, 2000). Thus, false-alarm rates and hit rates can contribute quite 
independently to a correlation of d' with another variable, and not necessarily according to 
the equal-but-opposite effects model implied by a difference score.  
Promotion and prevention focus 
 Higgins’ (1998) Regulatory Focus Theory (RFT) constitutes another source of 
multivariate constructs. According to RFT, there exist both situational and individual 
differences in people’s orientations toward goals. A promotion focus implies an orientation 
toward accomplishment and gains, whereas a prevention focus implies an orientation toward 
security and non-losses. The chronic aspects of these orientations (which form as a result of 
individual histories of goal pursuit) can be measured with the Regulatory Focus 
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Questionnaire (RFQ, Higgins et al., 2001). According to the authors, “[r]egulatory focus can 
be analyzed as a continuous variable with separate orthogonal scales for promotion pride and 
prevention pride. Additionally, it is possible to examine individual differences in either 
predominant promotion pride or prevention pride. In this case, the RFQ can be computed as a 
single categorical variable using a median split on the difference score of promotion pride 
minus prevention pride.” (Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004, p. 392) This quote is intriguing 
because it juxtaposes the wrong and the right methodological approaches and assumes that 
they are equivalent. The expression “predominantly” suggests that the authors conceptualize 
promotion and prevention focus as multivariate constructs. However, the strategy involving a 
difference score is inadequate to actually test the equal-but-opposite effects hypothesis 
implied by a difference score. Furthermore, the information loss incurred by median splits is 
almost never justifiable (MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002). 
Conclusion 
 As the previous section has shown, the multivariate approach put forward in 
Manuscripts #1 and #2 may profitably be extended to other social psychological constructs 
other than RIP and AA. Another indicator of the broad applicability of this approach is that 
similar methodological arguments already exist in the literature. However, like Manuscripts 
#1 and #2, they are tied to a specific substantive area of research, for instance, empathy 
(Cronbach, 1955) or the implicit ingroup bias discussed above (Blanton et al., 2006). 
Hopefully, the more general formulation of the problem presented in this introduction can 
help researchers to understand that any multivariate construct cannot be represented by a 
single numerical index and is better analyzed as a multivariate model, if the goal is to 
interpret relationships and effects without confounds. 
As explained in further detail in Manuscripts #1 and #2, appropriate statistical 
analyses constitute the remedy against the confounds associated with index variables of 
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multivariate constructs. Theoretically distinct components of an index can and should be 
treated as separate variables in a multivariate model, and the assumptions entering into a 
given index should be tested as a series of distinct statistical hypotheses and constraints. 
Nevertheless, I noted above that psychologists usually worry about other types of confounds, 
and I should note here that these are no less important than the specific confounds associated 
with multivariate constructs. For instance, in examining the relationship between positivity 
and negativity on the one hand, and subjective reports of ambivalence on the other 
(Manuscript #2), I tacitly assume that the sums or averages of the items are valid 
unidimensional representations of the underlying constructs. I also assume that the positive 
and negative memory  contents associated  with the attitude object are causally responsible 
for subjective reports of ambivalence. However plausible these assumptions may be, it 
remains a task for future research to examine their veridicality. I will discuss possible 
directions for future research in greater depth in the section “Final discussion and outlook”.  
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Abstract 
Relative ingroup prototypicality (RIP) is an important concept in the ingroup projection 
model of social discrimination and tolerance. This paper reviews measures of RIP currently 
in use and critically examines how the notion of relative ingroup prototypicality is captured 
by statistical tests treating RIP as a single variable. It is concluded that composite measures of 
RIP imply multiple statistical hypotheses that have previously been confounded. The value of 
an alternative multiple regression approach is illustrated in a study testing the hypothesis of a 
negative relationship between RIP and outgroup attitudes. Results based on the conventional 
univariate analyses would have confirmed or disconfirmed the hypothesis depending on the 
scoring method. In contrast, the multiple regression approach described in this paper resolves 
this ambiguity by suggesting that only outgroup prototypicality may be necessary to predict 
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Reconsidering the ‘relative’ in relative ingroup prototypicality 
 A perennial question of social psychology concerns the conditions of prejudice and 
discrimination against outgroups. Although social categorizations are everywhere, not every 
social category different from our own attracts our hostility (Park & Judd, 2005). Sometimes 
we perceive ourselves as stereotypically distinct from other groups but get along well with 
outgroup members. How are these peaceful encounters different from the endless examples of 
groups in conflict for no apparent reason? 
 The ingroup projection model (IPM, Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) directly addresses 
this question by elaborating on one of the central assumptions of self-categorization theory 
(Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), namely “[t]hat the comparison of 
different stimuli depends upon their categorization as identical (the same, similar) at a higher 
level of abstraction, and takes place on dimensions which define their higher level identity” 
(Turner et al., 1987, p. 48). It follows that groups are evaluated more positively when they 
compare favorably with other groups on the dimensions defining the higher level identity. 
Thus, the IPM hypothesizes “that an outgroup’s difference will be evaluated 
negatively if both ingroup and outgroup are sufficiently included in a more abstract social 
category and if the ingroup’s attributes are perceived as prototypical of the inclusive 
category” (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999, p.164). Translated into a quantitative hypothesis, 
this means that the outgroup should be evaluated more negatively to the extent that it is less 
similar to the prototype of the superordinate category than the ingroup. A shorthand 
expression of this hypothesis would be that relative ingroup prototypicality (RIP) is 
negatively correlated with attitudes toward the outgroup.  
This paper is about the complexities involved in testing this hypothesis. To be sure, 
the IPM provides a richer theoretical analysis of intergroup discrimination and tolerance than 
that, but a review of research on the model as a whole is beyond the scope of this paper. The 
only additional assumption of the IPM that we need to consider here is that people can have a 
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propensity to project attributes defining their ingroup onto the superordinate category, which, 
as it were, stacks the deck in favor of the ingroup. As a result of this projection, the outgroup 
is in fact compared against the standards of the ingroup – and is unlikely to measure up.  
In this paper, I am not concerned with the antecedents and the nature of the projection 
process. Instead, I will review different strategies to measure the result (i.e., RIP) and test its 
relationship with outgroup attitude. As will be indicated by this review, most previous 
research has employed rather complex measures of RIP that were constructed by integrating 
multiple component measures. I will demonstrate that such measures can lead into 
interpretational ambiguities jeopardizing the validity of conclusions. Therefore, in the 
empirical part of this paper, I will illustrate an alternative strategy to assess the empirical 
validity of the hypothesis of a negative relationship between RIP and outgroup attitude. 
RIP measures 
The simplest measures of RIP rely on blatant items asking group members how 
prototypical they think their ingroup and the outgroup are for the superordinate category that 
includes them both (Hegarty & Chryssochoou, 2005; Waldzus & Mummendey, 2004; 
Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003). However, to avoid social desirability 
concerns and other problems inherent to the blatant character of these measures, previous 
research has predominantly used one of two more indirect procedures to measure RIP. One 
indirect method of measuring RIP first identifies in a pretest n attributes including 
stereotypically distinct ingroup and outgroup attributes (and possibly some attributes relevant 
or irrelevant to both groups). Pretesting also establishes that these four types of attributes are 
balanced in terms of valence. Participants are then presented with this list of attributes and 
asked to rate each attribute with regard to its typicality for ingroup, outgroup, and the 
superordinate category, yielding a set of n * 3 ratings (Ullrich, Christ, & Schlüter, 2006, 
Study 2; Waldzus, Mummendey, & Wenzel, 2005; Wenzel, 2001, Study 2; Wenzel, 
Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003, Studies 1 and 2). Finally, RIP is typically calculated 
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as the difference between the Euclidean distances between the superordinate category and 
ingroup and outgroup, respectively, in an n-dimensional attribute space: 
RIPA = ∑∑ −−− 22 ))()(())()(( iiii INTSUPERTOUTTSUPERT ,  (1) 
where T(OUT)i refers to the rating of how typical attribute i is for the outgroup, T(IN)i  
refers to the rating of how typical attribute i is for the ingroup, T(SUPER)i  refers to the rating 
of how typical attribute i is for the superordinate category, and the squared differences are 
summed over the entire set of n attributes. Thus, higher scores on the RIP measure reflect 
perceptions of greater dissimilarity between outgroup and superordinate category than 
between ingroup and superordinate category, that is, greater relative prototypicality of the 
ingroup for the superordinate category. 
In other studies (Waldzus & Mummendey, 2004; Waldzus et al., 2003; Weber, 
Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2002; Wenzel et al., 2003, Study 3), participants first named 
distinct ingroup and outgroup attributes and then rated these self-generated attributes as to 
their typicality for the superordinate category. RIP was then calculated as the difference of 






kj ∑∑ − )(
)(
,    (2) 
where T(SUPER)j refers to the rating of how typical ingroup attribute j is for the 
superordinate category, T(SUPER)k  refers to the rating of how typical outgroup attribute k is 
for the superordinate category, and the typicality ratings are summed over the entire set of n 
ingroup and m outgroup attributes. 
Is there a reason to prefer one measure over the other? One way to address this 
question is to compare the predictive power of both measures with regard to the central 
variable to be explained. The published studies cited above that used one of the indirect 
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measures of RIP reported a total of nine correlations between outgroup attitude and RIPA or 
RIPB. I performed a small meta-analysis of these correlations to gauge the overall predictive 
power of RIPA and RIPB. The average correlation between RIPA and outgroup attitude was r = 
-.25 (N = 592, k = 4), and the average correlation between RIPB and outgroup attitude was r = 
-.21 (N = 264, k = 5).1 Thus, the measures appear to be interchangeable in terms of their 
predictive power, yielding a small to moderate effect size.  
One might argue that given equal predictive power, the measure that is easier to 
administer is superior to the other. Although measure RIPB is in fact both procedurally and 
computationally simpler, its drawback is that the researcher has little control if the 
idiosyncratically generated ingroup and outgroup attributes are balanced in terms of valence, 
which might be problematic when RIP is tested as a predictor of attitudes towards the 
outgroup. However, this potential confound could be eliminated if a similarly pre-tested set of 
attributes were used as described above for measure RIPA in an analysis that follows the 
model of RIPB. Since RIPB, leaving out the typicality ratings with regard to ingroup and 
outgroup, requires only one third of the ratings required for RIPA, it would still be 
procedurally and computationally simpler. 
Are the typicality ratings with regard to ingroup and outgroup really necessary when 
the attributes have already been pretested? The advantage of RIPA can be appreciated by 
comparing it to the efficiency gain associated with covariates in a randomized experiment. 
Although randomization ensures that the expectation of the difference between experimental 
and control groups before treatment is zero, experimental and control groups are likely to 
differ (if slightly) in any particular experiment. Similar to covariates, then, the purpose of 
measuring the attributes’ typicality for the ingroup and outgroup in spite of the pretest is to 
correct for minor differences between the pretest sample and the experimental sample, thereby 
increasing precision and power. 
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By and large then, RIPA and RIPB appear to be equally viable ways of measuring RIP. 
Compared with the more direct measures of RIP briefly discussed at the beginning of this 
section, the strengths of RIPA and RIPB reside in the likely absence of social desirability 
concerns. There is only a minor tradeoff to be made between a slightly more precise measure 
(RIPA) and a slightly more economical measure (RIPB), the outcome of which depends on the 
researcher’s resources or theoretical interests. Having identified the two most promising 
measures of previous RIP research, I will now analyze more closely how the theoretical 
construct – relative ingroup prototypicality – is captured in statistical analyses relating RIPA 
and RIPB to other measures. 
Statistical tests of the RIP-attitude link 
At its core, the construct RIP refers to a difference between judgments. When ingroup 
projection occurs, the ingroup is seen as more prototypical of a superordinate category than 
the outgroup, and to the extent that this is true, that is, the more relatively prototypical the 
ingroup is perceived to be, the more negative should be the outgroup attitudes. In 
operationalizing the construct, researchers have accordingly relied on difference scores as 
shown in equations (1) and (2). General problems inherent to the use of difference scores 
include their potentially reduced reliability (e.g., Cronbach & Furby, 1970, pp. 70-71), the 
inevitability of (spurious) correlations with their component scores (e.g., Cohen & Cohen, 
1983, pp. 414-417; Cronbach, 1955), and the related problem that correlations of difference 
scores with an external variable are confounded with the correlations of the component scores 
with that variable (e.g., Johns, 1981). In this paper, I address the implications of the latter 
problem, the confounding of the RIP score with its components. My goal is to draw attention 
to the possible confounds and equip future research with an alternative analytic strategy that 




 RELATIVE INGROUP PROTOTYPICALITY 
Confounds of RIPBB
The problem can be seen more clearly when the correlation between RIP and outgroup 
attitude (or any other external variable) is expressed in terms of the constituents of the RIP 
formula. Let us turn to the simpler case of the correlation (denoted as ρ) between outgroup 
















=  ,   (3) 
where T(IN) and T(OUT) refer to the mean perceived typicality of ingroup and 
outgroup attributes, respectively, for the superordinate category, and ATT refers to outgroup 
attitude. Equation (3) shows that the correlation of RIPB and outgroup attitude is given by the 
difference between the covariances of outgroup attitude with ingroup and outgroup 
prototypicality, respectively, divided by the standard deviations of outgroup attitude and the 
RIPB difference score. 
A first insight offered by equation (3) is that nothing enters into the RIPB - ATT 
correlation that would carry information about individuals’ perceiving the ingroup to be 
relatively more prototypical than the outgroup. If we assume standard deviations of 1 for ATT 
and RIPB to simplify the formula, the average correlation obtained in previous research (r = -
.21), could be the result of any combination of correlations between ATT and T(IN) and ATT 
and T(OUT) that satisfies the condition that .21.)(,)(, −=− OUTTATTINGTATT rr Consider the 
following four situations that could have brought about the overall correlation between ATT 
and RIPB: 
(a) a correlation of r = -.21 between ATT and T(IN) and a zero correlation between 
ATT and T(OUT), (b) a correlation of r = .21 between ATT and T(OUT) and a zero 
correlation between ATT and T(IN), (c) a stronger negative correlation between ATT and 
T(IN) than between ATT and T(OUT), or (d) a stronger positive correlation between ATT and 
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T(OUT) than between ATT and T(IN). The differences between these four cases reveal the 
extent of information loss implied by calculating a difference score between T(IN) and 
T(OUT). But does the loss of information really matter? After all, the IPM makes predictions 
about RIP, not about T(IN) and T(OUT) separately. The cost of these confounds becomes 
apparent if we recall that the IPM is geared towards the amelioration of real-world conflicts. 
Although correlations provide only a weak basis for social interventions (Box, 1966), they are 
currently the best evidence we have regarding the effects of RIP on outgroup attitude. If we 
were to design an intervention aimed at improving people’s outgroup attitudes, it would be of 
crucial importance to know the separate effects of T(IN) and T(OUT). Should we try to 
reduce T(IN), e.g. by convincing people that the world does not revolve around them, 
possibly at the expense of their collective self-esteem? Or would it be sufficient to increase 
T(OUT), e.g. by convincing people that the prototype of a given superordinate category is 
flexible enough to include both ingroup and outgroup attributes?  
As these unanswered questions show, relationships obtained with difference scores 
can obscure what is really going on in the data and provide suboptimal guidance for social 
interventions. How, then, can we test the relationship between ATT and RIP without relying 
on difference scores? Following Edwards (e.g., 1994), I propose that a more adequate test of a 
relationship involving a difference-based construct is possible if the implied hypotheses about 
the constituents of the difference are made explicit. Toward that end, we merely need to 
expand the simple regression (Equation 4 below) to a multiple regression (Equation 5 below): 
[ ] errorOUTTINTbbATT +−+= )()(10 ,    (4) 
errorOUTTbINTbbATT +−+= )()( 110 .    (5) 
With regard to the simple regression of ATT on RIPB calculated as in (3), it is 
apparent that the IPM hypothesizes that the regression coefficient for RIPB will be negative, 
that is, b1 < 0 in equation (4). Expanding this equation yields (5), from which the implied 
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hypotheses about the constituents of the difference score can be ascertained. Specifically, it 
can be seen that the test of the IPM by means of a difference score not only hypothesizes that 
the effect of T(IN) is negative, but also constrains the effect of T(OUT) to be positive and of 
the same size as T(IN), for equation (5) shows that the parameter for T(OUT) is the same as 
for T(IN) except for the reversal of sign. Thus, a strict test of the ATT-RIPB relationship 
requires estimating a multiple regression model predicting ATT on the basis of T(IN) and 
T(OUT), and answering the following questions: Is the effect of T(IN) negative? Is the effect 
of T(OUT) positive? Do the effects of T(IN) and T(OUT) sum to zero? If either of the first 
two questions does not lead to an affirmative answer, the hypothesis of a negative relationship 
between ATT and RIPB is rejected and it is unnecessary to test the equality of the absolute 
magnitudes of T(IN) and T(OUT).  
Finally, a caveat should be borne in mind regarding the internal consistencies of T(IN) 
and T(OUT). As pointed out by Cronbach (1992), “similarity in the abstract may be an 
unprofitable focus” (p. 390). It is worth examining if the effects of T(IN) and T(OUT) are 
roughly similar across attributes before the typicality ratings are averaged to represent ingroup 
and outgroup prototypicality in the more abstract sense. For instance, if there are four ingroup 
attributes and four outgroup attributes, one could randomly define four pairs and examine if 
the pairs are interchangeable in terms of the effects of T(IN) and T(OUT). Merely calculating 
the internal consistencies of T(IN) and T(OUT), treating attributes as items, may be too 
simple because these items are likely to contain systematic measurement error reflecting 
participants’ idiosyncratic usage of the response scale. 
Confounds of RIPA 
Because RIPA, too, is a difference score and its effects are confounded with the effects 
of its components, it cannot be used to adequately test the hypothesis of a negative 
relationship between ATT and RIP. At first blush, the remedy appears to be the same as the 
one outlined for RIPB, that is, to estimate the effects of the constituents of the difference score 
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separately. Indeed, at the conceptual level, the Euclidean distances that are subtracted from 
one another in equation (1) should be the exact opposite of the mean typicality ratings in 
equation (2) because the typicality ratings are intended to represent similarity between the 
subgroups and the superordinate category, and the distances are intended to represent 
dissimilarity. However, the Euclidean distances introduce a new source of confounds, namely 
the set of difference scores calculated by subtracting a given attribute’s typicality for the 
subgroup from its typicality for the superordinate category. If we focus on one attribute at a 
time (as suggested at the end of the previous section and indicated below by the subscript i), 
we can rewrite equation (1) using the absolute difference instead of the root of the squared 
difference: 
RIPA(i) = iiii INTSUPERTOUTTSUPERT )()()()( −−− .   (6) 
Equation (6) shows that RIPA is made up of a difference between absolute differences. 
Thus, in order to deconfound this index, we need to combine the analytic strategies suggested 
by Edwards (1994) for differences and absolute differences. We begin by inserting the right-
hand side of (6) into a simple regression equation predicting ATT: 
[ ] errorINTSUPERTOUTTSUPERTbbATT iiii +−−−+= )()()()(10 .  (7) 
Then we multiply the index through by the regression coefficient b1, equivalently to 
the procedure applied to RIPB, though leaving the absolute differences intact for the moment: 
[ ] [ ] errorINTSUPERTbOUTTSUPERTbbATT iiii +−−−+= )()()()( 110 . (8) 










10 ,   (9) 
where V is a dummy variable that equals 0 when the  
difference is positive, equals 1 when the 
ii OUTTSUPERT )()( −
ii OUTTSUPERT )()( −  difference is negative, and is 
randomly set to 0 or 1 when ii OUTTSUPERT )()( −  equals 0. By the same logic, W is set to 
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11110  .  (10) 
As a result of the last step in our algebra, the term  drops out of the 
equation, which indicates the first constraint implied by RIP
iSUPERT )(
A (namely, that its coefficient is 
zero). Thus, to test this constraint along with the others, we put the term back into the 
unconstrained equation. Similarly, it is necessary to include the main effects of the dummy 
variables V and W to rule out their confounding the interaction terms. The hypothesis of a 
negative relationship between ATT and RIPA(i) would then be tested by estimating the 










543210   (11) 
The conceptual hypothesis implies the following statistical hypotheses: , 
, , , , and , and the following constraints: , 
, , 
02 >b
03 <b 06 >b 07 <b 08 <b 09 >b 0541 === bbb
32 bb −= 76 bb −= 98 bb −= , , and 26 2bb = 38 2bb = . The large number of null and 
alternative hypotheses implied by the conceptual hypothesis – which will further increase 
with the number of times equation (11) is estimated for different attributes – suggests that it 
may be wise to adjust the nominal α-level of the significance tests (downward for the 
alternative hypotheses, upward for the null hypotheses), in order to avoid spurious results. 
However, this strategy is only useful if a large enough sample is available, because the large 
number of (probably highly multicollinear) variables reduces power and destabilizes the 
parameter estimates (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). It is thus doubtful if theoretical interest will 
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Summary and preliminary conclusions 
 The previous two sections have made explicit what kinds of confounds are to be 
expected when RIPA and RIPB are used to predict a dependent variable. The first lesson to be 
drawn from these considerations is that RIPA and RIPB should be treated as multivariate 
models rather than single variables. With regard to RIPB, it appears quite feasible to translate 
it into a multivariate model so as to determine to what extent T(IN) and T(OUT) conform to 
the theoretical predictions of the RIP hypothesis. In fact, I will demonstrate this analytic 
strategy below with empirical data. With regard to RIPA, the complexity of the model that 
would be required for an adequate test of the RIP hypothesis may be too taxing on the 
resources (i.e., sample size, complexity of analyses) that researchers are willing to invest. 
Nevertheless, I hope that by making explicit the entire set of hypotheses and constraints 
underlying RIPA, I have drawn sufficient attention to the number of potential confounds of 
RIPA so as to argue against its use as a single variable.  
In sum, the most adequate statistical test of the RIP-outgroup attitude link appears to 
consist of estimating the independent effects of T(IN) and T(OUT) in a multiple regression 
equation and to test the three hypotheses implied by RIPB. Lest all the advantages of RIPA 
should be sacrificed in light of the complex model it implies, I would suggest that T(IN) and 
T(OUT) should refer to a set of pretested ingroup and outgroup attributes as in previous 
studies employing the RIPA measure. 
Empirical demonstration of the alternative approach 
The goal of the study reported below was to test the hypothesis that RIP is negatively 
related to participants’ attitude toward an outgroup while improving on two aspects of 
previous research. First, I applied the analytic strategy outlined above for RIPB so that the 
resulting conclusions about the RIP-outgroup attitude link could be compared with those 
based on the composite measures of previous studies. Second, although previous research has 
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relied on single-item measures of attribute typicality, I sought to obtain more reliable multi-
item measurements to make a possible divergence of conclusions more readily interpretable. 
Method 
Participants 
 One-hundred and twenty-seven students were recruited on the campus of a middle-
sized German university for an online survey on “personality traits of students”, in which they 
provided typicality ratings of several personality dimensions for male students, female 
students, and students in general. They were told that two cinema coupons would be raffled 
among participants. Although it would have been more desirable to have a balanced number 
of male and female students, the sample was predominantly female. Furthermore, many 
participants did not complete the relatively long survey (ca. 30 min. duration). Thus, in the 
interest of conclusive results I restrict the following analyses to a subsample of N = 72 female 
students with complete data on all relevant items. The age range of participants was from 18 
to 42 years, 76% of participants were younger than 23 years. 
Procedure 
 Participants first provided demographic information and completed several scales 
unrelated to the present research question. They were then presented with a series of items 
from the observer form of the revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R, Ostendorf & 
Angleitner, 2004) and asked to indicate how much each trait description applied to their 
ingroup (female students), the outgroup (male students), and the superordinate category 
(students in general). For instance, an item from the aesthetics subscale was presented as 
follows: “What would you say about female students in general? Aesthetics and art mean a lot 
to them.” The response options were “strong disagreement” (1) to “strong agreement” (5). 
Each scale consists of 8 items, some of which are reversed. The order of judgments referring 
to different targets (i.e., ingroup, outgroup, or superordinate category) was randomly 
determined, as was the order of items within targets. After completing 192 personality ratings, 
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participants were asked to indicate their attitude toward male students and enter their e-mail 
address if they wished to take part in the raffle and/or wished to receive further information 
about the study. 
Measures 
 NEO-PI-R subscales. The German manual of the NEO-PI-R includes gender norms of 
the subscales (of the observer form) for young adults, which constitute the “pretest” of the 
subscales’ typicality for ingroup and outgroup. I selected at least one of the subscales of each 
of the Big 5 personality dimensions, namely those that exhibit the largest differences between 
genders and appeared to be reasonably applicable to large social categories: Anxiety (more 
pronounced among young women = F), aesthetics (F), self-consciousness (F), ideas (more 
pronounced among young men = M), gregariousness (F), excitement-seeking (M), altruism 
(F), and dutifulness (F). These gender differences were also perceived as such by my 
participants, as is confirmed by the ingroup and outgroup typicality ratings for the personality 
facets, which differed significantly in the expected directions (see Table 1 for the means and 
effect sizes). 
 RIPA. The conventional RIPA index was calculated as in equation (1). 
 RIPB. The conventional RIPB BB index was calculated as in equation (2). 
 Outgroup attitude. Attitude toward male students was measured with eight items that 
were roughly based on items used in previous research on the IPM (e.g. Wenzel et al., 2003). 
However, preliminary analyses indicated that the item intercorrelations were quite low, so I 
selected only three items that together formed an acceptably internally consistent scale 
(Cronbach’s α = .63):  (1) “I like working together with male students”,  (2) “I enjoy the 
company of male students”, (3) “I would like to work in a long-term project together with a 
male student”. Interestingly, all of these items refer to a willingness for close contact with 
male students. The response options were from “strong disagreement” (1) to “strong 
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agreement” (5). The items were averaged to yield an index of outgroup attitude. Higher scores 
represent a more positive attitude. 
Results 
 In order to establish a baseline against which to compare the analytic strategy I am 
proposing, I first calculated the correlations between outgroup attitude and RIPA (r = .02, p = 
.85) and RIPB (r = -.25, p = .04). Interestingly, results of the indices do not converge as in the 
meta-analysis reported above. Note, however, that these indices are compared here for the 
first time within one and the same study. Because both indices operationalize the same 
construct, this suggests that the data are not consistent with the assumptions implied by a 
literal reading of the relative ingroup prototypicality hypothesis. 
B
 In order to better understand what aspects of the complex construct of RIP are borne 
out by the data, I employed the regression-based strategy described above for RIPB. I first 
screened if results would largely agree across the different combinations of ingroup and 
outgroup personality facets. Thus, I estimated twelve regression models with outgroup 
attitude as the dependent variable and ingroup and outgroup prototypicality for the 
superordinate category as separate predictors. For each regression model, I selected a different 
combination of the 6 (Ingroup) x 2 (Outgroup) personality facets. As can be seen in Table 2, 
the results of ten out of twelve regression models were consistent with a model that included 
the average T(IN) and T(OUT) scores as in equation (2). Thus, to simplify the presentation of 
results, I describe only the results of the latter model. Recall that this model was estimated to 
test the following hypotheses: Is the effect of T(IN) negative? Is the effect of T(OUT) 
positive? Do the effects of T(IN) and T(OUT) sum to zero?  
B
 Overall, the regression model explained 13% of the variance in outgroup attitudes, 
F(2,69) = 5.08, p = .01. The effect of T(IN) was b = .10, t(69) = .37, p = .71, which 
disconfirms Hypothesis 1 (and renders a test of Hypothesis 3 unnecessary). Note that the 
absence of an effect of ingroup prototypicality can neither be attributed to lower reliabilities 
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of the measures of ingroup attributes (see Cronbach’s alphas in Table 1), nor to a ceiling 
effect, for the means shown in Table 1 are in the middle range of the scale ranging from 1 to 
5. The effect of T(OUT) was b = .51, t(69) = 2.75, p = .01, supporting Hypothesis 2. Thus, 
while ingroup prototypicality did not explain more than a trivial amount of variance in 
outgroup attitude, results indicated that the more prototypical participants judged the outgroup 
to be for the superordinate category, the more positive was their attitude toward the outgroup. 
Discussion 
 Studies in social perception are notoriously prone to statistical confounds because they 
rely on judgments made by multiple perceivers with regard to multiple targets (e.g., Blanton, 
Jaccard, Gonzales, & Christie, 2006; Cronbach, 1955; Krueger, 1996). This paper has 
critically examined how the notion of relative ingroup prototypicality (RIP) is captured by the 
use of difference scores in the statistical tests of a negative relationship between RIP and 
outgroup attitude. The theoretical part of the paper has made explicit the multitude of 
hypotheses that are implied by the indices RIPA and RIPB  that have most frequently been used 
in previous research. It was concluded that when these indices are used as single variables, it 
is impossible to disentangle effects of ingroup and outgroup typicality or to identify spurious 
correlations. Therefore, an alternative approach was described which treats RIP as a 
multivariate model implying multiple statistical hypotheses.  
B
The results of an empirical study support the superiority of the alternative approach by 
revealing the following findings: (1) RIPA and RIPB, which have been compared here for the 
first time directly, led to different conclusions about the RIP-outgroup attitude link, with the 
former measure being unrelated and the latter being negatively related to the attitude measure. 
This divergence was to be expected given the number of (different) confounds underlying 
each index. (2) Whereas RIP
B
A and RIPBB would have supported or weakened the IPM’s 
hypothesis as a whole, the alternative approach revealed a more fine-grained pattern that 
appears to be more useful for devising social interventions. More specifically, ingroup 
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prototypicality (and, by implication, relative ingroup prototypicality) was unrelated to 
outgroup attitude, but outgroup prototypicality for the superordinate category was positively 
associated with outgroup attitude. This finding would have been overlooked if ingroup and 
outgroup prototypicality had been collapsed into a single measure (although the correlations 
reported in Waldzus and Mummendey 2004, Experiment 2, Inclusion condition, point in the 
same direction). If this pattern of results turned out to be robust in future studies, it would be 
more parsimonious to postulate a positive association between outgroup prototypicality and 
outgroup attitude than to postulate a more complex model about RIP as implied by the indices 
RIPA and RIPB.  
While these are clearly speculative points that have to be addressed by future research, 
the main contribution of the present paper was to alert researchers to the possibility of 
confounds underlying the RIP measures, and to suggest an alternative approach that would 
allow for the detection of these confounds. Models do not have to be exactly true to be useful 
(Box, 1979), but to make cumulative progress it is vital that researchers discover where their 
models depart from empirical reality. It is possible that the relative roles of ingroup and 
outgroup prototypicality depend on the nature of the specific intergroup relations that are 
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Footnote 
1 These correlations are weighted averages, taking sample size into account. From 
Waldzus and Mummendey (2004), I discarded the reported correlation from the exclusion 
condition (because a correlation different from zero was not predicted) and averaged the 
correlations from the inclusion condition that were reported separately for outgroup attitude as 
measured on relevant and irrelevant dimensions.
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Table 1 
Means, Cronbach’s alphas, and effect sizes of the NEO-PI-R subscales for all target categories (N = 72 female students) 
 Target category Effect sizes of paired comparisons 
 (1) Ingroup (2) Outgroup (3) Superordinate  (1) vs. (2) (1) vs. (3) (2) vs. 
(3) 
 M α M α M α d d d 
Anxiety 3.51 .81 2.96 .76 3.28 .79 1.03 0.57 -0.71 
Aesthetics 3.61 .81 2.96 .69 3.34 .75 1.10 0.92 -0.80 
Self-consciousness  3.30 .53 2.71 .68 2.91 .59 1.10 0.93 -0.54 
Ideas 3.36 .75 3.57 .78 3.62 .74 -0.43 -0.72 -0.13* 
Gregariousness 3.62 .71 3.52 .73 3.67 .78 0.25 -0.18* -0.37 
Excitement-seeking 3.13 .48 3.58 .71 3.40 .64 -1.09 -0.76 0.61 
Altruism 3.45 .71 3.00 .71 3.17 .76 0.84 0.73 -0.37 
Dutifulness 3.16 .80 2.68 .78 2.81 .78 0.96 0.91 -0.35 
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Note. The standardized mean difference d was calculated as 
n
t , where t refers to the t-values of the paired comparisons between 
the category-specific subscales, and n is equal to 72. Positive values indicate a higher mean in the left column of each 
comparison.  
All effect sizes are significant at α = .05, except those marked with an asterisk.
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Table 2 
Regression coefficients of ingroup and outgroup prototypicality predicting 
outgroup attitude 






 b SE b SE 
Aesthetics (F) and ideas (M) 0.13 0.17 0.27 0.16 
Gregariousness (F) and ideas (M) 0.30* 0.14 0.18 0.15 
Altruism (F) and ideas (M) 0.10 0.13 0.29* 0.14 
Dutifulness (F) and ideas (M) 0.05 0.12 0.31* 0.14 
Anxiety (F) and ideas (M) -0.13 0.12 0.33* 0.14 
Self-consciousness (F) and ideas (M) -0.12 0.16 0.31* 0.14 
Aesthetics (F) and exc.-seek. (M) 0.12 0.16 0.44* 0.17 
Gregariousness (F) and exc.-seek. (M) 0.21 0.16 0.32 0.20 
Altruism (F) and exc.-seek. (M) 0.12 0.12 0.46** 0.16 
Dutifulness (F) and exc.-seek. (M) 0.13 0.12 0.50** 0.16 
Anxiety (F) and exc.-seek. (M) -0.11 0.12 0.48** 0.16 
Self-consciousness (F) and exc.-seek. (M) -0.10 0.15 0.47** 0.16 
T(IN) and T(OUT) 0.10 0.28 0.51** 0.19 
 
Note. exc.-seek. = Excitement-seeking, T(IN) = mean ingroup prototypicality, 
T(OUT) = mean outgroup prototypicality, b = Unstandardized regression 
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Abstract 
The attitude strength literature suggests that ambivalent attitude structures are associated with 
less stable and consequential attitudes. Such claims are often tested on the basis of an 
ambivalence index derived from largely independent measures of positivity and negativity. In 
the present article, we demonstrate that statistical analyses treating ambivalence as a single 
variable can produce misleading results and do not allow for competitive tests between 
different ambivalence models. We illustrate how a Multivariate Approach to Ambivalence 
Models (MAAM) can be used instead to examine ambivalence as the conceptual independent 
or moderator variable, comparing the Conflicting Reactions Model (CRM) and the 
Similarity-Intensity Model (SIM) of ambivalence. Studies 1 and 2 indicated that the CRM 
explains subjective ambivalence toward outgroups better than the SIM. Studies 3 and 4 
replicated the typical moderator effect of ambivalence on stability of outgroup attitudes using 
a univariate ambivalence index, but multivariate analyses based on the MAAM revealed this 
effect to be spurious. Study 5 used Monte Carlo methodology to verify that this moderator 
artifact occurs above chance levels. Our results should caution researchers against treating 
ambivalence as a single variable. 
 
Keywords: Attitude Ambivalence, Attitude Strength, Data Analysis, Moderator Effects, 
Intergroup Attitudes
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Attitude ambivalence or statistical artifact? 
Multivariate constructs require multivariate analyses 
In their milder forms, pathologies often feel familiar. Such is the case with the feeling 
of ambivalence. When Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler (1911) introduced the concept to 
psychology, it was primarily meant to capture pathological forms of loving and hating the 
same object, such as can be observed among schizophrenics. Yet Bleuler already pointed out 
the ubiquity of ambivalence in the everyday life of normal people, foreshadowing the current 
surge of ambivalence research in many areas of psychology, including social psychology 
(e.g., Jost & Burgess, 2000; Maio, Greenland, Bernard, & Esses, 2001; Mucchi-Faina & 
Cicoletti, 2006; Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002; Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & Jarvis, 
2006; van Harreveld, van der Pligt, de Vries, Wenneker, & Verhue, 2004), organizational 
psychology (e.g., Brooks, Highhouse, Russell, & Mohr, 2003; Piderit, 2000), health 
psychology (e.g., Armitage, Povey, & Arden, 2003; Dahl, Darke, Gorn, & Weinberg, 2005; 
Dormandy, Hankins, & Marteau, 2006; Sparks, Conner, James, Shepherd, & Povey, 2001), 
and political psychology (e.g., Basinger & Lavine, 2005; Craig & Martinez, 2005; Rudolph, 
2005).  
Indeed, people often see both favorable and unfavorable aspects in a person, thing, or 
idea. However, they may not always be aware of this ambivalence or willing to express it (cf. 
Conner & Sparks, 2002; Jonas, Brömer, & Diehl, 2000; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). At the very 
least, as Bleuler already observed, non-schizophrenic people tend to tally an object’s 
favorable and unfavorable aspects and ascertain the balance. Thus, when social psychologists 
adopted the concept for non-clinical applications, they had to find a way of measuring 
ambivalence other than just asking people how ambivalent they feel about something. In fact, 
social psychologists began to collect data in such a way that would allow them to do the 
tallying themselves. For instance, the new data collection procedures would require people to 
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list the salient positive and negative attributes of an object (Scott, 1969), or to rate separately 
the extent of their positivity and negativity with regard to an object using split semantic 
differentials (Kaplan, 1972).  
Various mathematical formulae have been proposed for quantifying ambivalence 
toward an object based on such separately obtained measures of positivity and negativity.1 
Each formula rests on a model of the nature of ambivalence that contains several testable 
assumptions about the effects of positivity and negativity (for an overview, see Breckler, 
1994; Jonas et al., 2000; Priester & Petty, 1996; Riketta, 2000; Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 
1995). However, we argue here that these assumptions have never been rigorously tested 
because previous research has combined the separate measures of positivity and negativity 
into a single index. To be sure, it is admissible and convenient to refer to the scores resulting 
from the ambivalence formulae by the shorthand “ambivalence”, just like one would refer to 
one of Hull’s equations by the shorthand “habit strength” (cf. MacCorquodale & Meehl, 
1948). However, as the present paper will demonstrate, it can be seriously misleading to test 
hypotheses about ambivalence by subjecting such ambivalence scores to statistical analyses 
involving other variables (which is where ambivalence researchers differ from Hull). 
Results obtained from standard analyses widely used by ambivalence researchers are 
in general open to multiple interpretations because ambivalence scores are necessarily 
confounded with their constituents. As a result, it is difficult to compare empirical results 
across laboratories, which impedes cumulative progress in research on ambivalence. The 
crucial problem of the confounding of a composite variable is of a more general nature and 
has long been recognized in the area of discrepancy or change scores (Campbell & Kenny, 
1999; Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Cronbach, 1955; Edwards, 1994; Johns, 1981; Stelzl, 1982). 
But ambivalence scores are not change scores, and the consequences of this confounding may 
be less obvious. Therefore, the goals of the present paper are (1) to systematically examine 
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the threats to validity arising from this confounding, (2) to propose a new data-analytic 
procedure that will allow researchers to unambiguously test hypotheses about the effects of 
ambivalence, and (3) to illustrate the superiority of the new approach both in empirical and 
computer simulation studies. 
The concept of validity is used here in the general sense of a match between a 
numerical estimate (e.g., a regression coefficient) and the label given to that estimate 
(Reichardt, 2006). The labels that ambivalence researchers typically want to attach to their 
estimates are (1) “Ambivalence influences Y” or (2) “Ambivalence moderates the relationship 
between X and Y”. In the present paper, we are less concerned with the causal undertones of 
the terms “influences” or “effect” – the effect may or may not be causal. Rather, our goal is to 
show that, given current data-analytic practice, researchers may misattribute an effect to 
ambivalence when it is due to (possibly trivial) effects of positivity or negativity alone. 
Although the theoretical argument of this paper does not depend on the specific meaning of X 
or Y, the examples and empirical studies presented below join the majority of previous 
studies that consider ambivalence as a measure of attitude strength. Therefore, we begin with 
a brief review of the theoretical assumptions underlying the attitude strength concept.  
The Attitude Strength Perspective 
The paramount interest in the attitude concept is rooted in the idea that to know or 
change a person’s attitude is to know or change how that person will likely act within a given 
behavioral domain. Toward that end, social psychologists infer a person’s standing on a latent 
attitude continuum from the observed covariation between stimuli representing the attitude 
object and a person’s evaluative responses to it (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). However, more 
often than not, the sample of observed responses available to the researcher consists of little 
more than a few probes of attitudinal responses obtained at a single point in time. Whether 
these attitude probes prove predictive of future behavior should depend, first of all, on the 
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temporal stability of the measured attitude (Ajzen, 1996; Eagly & Chaiken, 1995; Lord & 
Lepper, 1999; Schwartz, 1978). If the attitude no longer exists when behavior is assessed, it 
can exert no influence. Yet the degree of temporal stability of attitude toward a given object 
may be as uncertain as the correspondence of the measured attitude and future behavior.  
Thus, to enhance prediction of behavior, personality and social psychologists alike 
have invoked a concept of strength, although applying it to different parts of psychology’s 
fundamental behavioral equation. As stated by Lewin (e.g., 1951), this equation simply holds 
that responses in any given situation are jointly determined by factors internal to the person 
(in the present context, the person’s prior attitude) and situational factors that constitute the 
psychological environment. This means that prediction will be enhanced to the extent that 
situational factors are weak and internal factors are strong. Personality psychologists have 
applied the strength concept to situations. Weak situations are characterized by a lack of 
implicit or explicit guidelines for appropriate behavior (Mischel, 1977), which leaves more 
variance in behavior to be explained by personality variables. Social psychologists, on the 
other hand, have applied the strength concept to the internal attitude variable. Attitudes are 
said to be strong to the extent that they persist over time, resist pressures to change, and 
impact on judgment and behavior (Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  
Paralleling interest in the attitude concept, a substantial literature has evolved 
examining several attitude attributes that would allow inferences regarding attitude strength 
(for reviews, see Petty & Krosnick, 1995; Raden, 1985; Scott, 1968; Visser, Bizer, & 
Krosnick, 2006). For instance, such inferences may be based on asking people how certain 
they are regarding their attitude (Abelson, 1988; Gross, Holtz, & Miller, 1995) or observing 
how quickly they respond to the attitude probe (Fazio, 1995). Attitude ambivalence is one of 
the proposed attributes whose relation to the strength concept is relatively obvious. By 
definition (see below), ambivalent attitudes are characterized by equally strong positive and 
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negative evaluative tendencies and thus a lack of directional guidance. Hence, when people 
holding ambivalent attitudes introspect about their attitudes or prepare for action, they have to 
resort to situational cues to decide which of the evaluative tendencies to give more weight 
(Katz, 1981). This will diminish the impact of their existing attitude.  
In sum, the nomological network of the attitude strength construct relates ambivalence 
to a variety of other strength indicators (e.g., certainty or accessibility), and to the defining 
features of strong attitudes (e.g., attitude’s impact on judgment and behavior). Empirical 
investigations of the construct validity of attitude strength therefore often use correlation or 
regression analyses to examine how well ambivalence predicts (or is predicted by) other 
attitude attributes, and moderated multiple regression analyses to test the postulated 
moderating influence of ambivalence on attitude effects. In the following sections, we will 
analyze in some detail why the statistical analyses called for by the attitude strength 
perspective lead to ambiguous conclusions about ambivalence models. 
Models of Attitude Ambivalence and Statistical Analyses 
Numerous ways have been proposed to model ambivalence as a function of positive 
and negative object evaluations. For instance, in their influential paper, Priester and Petty 
(1996) reviewed eight such models. For space limitations, only Kaplan’s (1972) Conflicting 
Reactions Model (CRM) and the Similarity-Intensity Model (SIM, Thompson et al., 1995) 
are considered here in detail. We opted for the CRM because it is the simplest ambivalence 
model, and for the SIM because it is the most widely employed one (Conner & Sparks, 
2002). However, the following demonstrations should by and large be easy to apply to other 
ambivalence models. 
In the following, we assume (1) that separate measures of positivity and negativity (P, 
N) toward an attitude object form the basis for statistical calculations, (2) that these measures 
are scored in the same direction, such that higher scores of P reflect more positivity and 
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higher scores of N reflect more negativity. We begin with the case of ambivalence as the 
conceptual independent variable and then consider the most frequently occurring but 
somewhat more complicated case of ambivalence as a moderator variable of attitude effects. 
Within each subsection, we first discuss the assumptions of the ambivalence model, then we 
explore possible confounds underlying the current data-analytic approach, and finally, we 
suggest a viable alternative approach.  
Ambivalence as the Independent Variable 
 Ambivalent attitude structures are often viewed as causes of other measures of 
attitude strength. Most prominently, perceiving one’s attitude as ambivalent (i.e., subjective 
ambivalence) should be a function of ambivalence as assessed with separate measures of 
positivity and negativity. To measure ambivalence, researchers rely on one of several 
formulae to combine the measures of positivity and negativity into a single index. Let us first 
turn to the formula suggested by the CRM. 
Assumptions of the CRM 
Kaplan (1972) defines ambivalence as “the amount of exactly counterbalancing 
positive and negative affect” (pp. 368-369) and provides a formula for it: 
       ||)( NPNPA −−+= .    (1) 
He calls the sum of positivity and negativity a person feels toward an attitude object 
“total affect” and the absolute difference between these measures “polarization”. Formula (1) 
suggests that ambivalence increases as total affect )( NP +  increases and decreases as 
polarization ( ) increases. As pointed out by Priester and Petty (1996), who also 
coined the term CRM, this formula essentially suggests that ambivalence (A) is a positive 
linear function of the measure (P, N) exhibiting the smaller value, i.e. the conflicting reaction. 
Thus, 
|| NP −
A = 2* Min(P,N) .    (2) 
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To illustrate the CRM formula, let us assume that P and N can only take on either a 
low (e.g., 0) or a high (e.g., 1) value, yielding a 2 × 2 table of possible combinations. In this 
scenario, we would find an A score of 1 when P and N are both high, and an A score of 0 in 
all other cases. Thus, the CRM attributes the highest degree of ambivalence to people with 
strong positive and strong negative feelings toward the attitude object – which is an 
assumption shared by all ambivalence models – but does not distinguish between all other 
cells of the simplifying 2 × 2 table. Although the latter assumption is directly challenged by 
the SIM (discussed below), let us assume for the moment that the theoretical assumptions of 
the CRM are perfectly reasonable.  
Testing the Assumptions of the CRM: Problems with the Current Approach 
 A straightforward way to test the assumptions of the CRM would be to examine how 
well it predicts subjective ambivalence. Although a perfect correspondence is not to be 
expected (cf. Jonas et al., 2000), subjective ambivalence is in fact often regarded as the “gold 
standard” for ambivalence models (e.g., Thompson et al., 1995).  
To begin exploring the possible confounds of the ambivalence index, consider again 
the simplifying 2 × 2 table. If we have an experimental design with P and N as orthogonal 
factors and subjective ambivalence as the dependent variable, the assumptions of the CRM 
could be tested by comparing the High/High cell mean against the other three cell means. The 
expected pattern would reveal that subjective ambivalence would be greater in the High/High 
condition than in the remaining conditions, but that subjective ambivalence would not differ 
across the remaining conditions. It is well known that a hypothesized pattern such as this 
cannot be tested with a single-degree-of-freedom test (e.g., Abelson, 1996). For instance, 
although a contrast coded [+3, -1, -1, -1] may suggest itself in the case of the CRM, the 
associated null hypothesis may be trivially rejected because of a main effect of P or N or 
both. This is because the above contrast would not be orthogonal to a contrast for a main 
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effect, e.g., [+1, -1, +1, -1]. In a similar vein, Rosnow and Rosenthal conclude from their 
discussion of omnibus tests: “Whenever we have tested a fixed effect with df > 1 for chi 
square or for the numerator of F, we have tested a question in which we almost surely are not 
interested.” (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989, p. 1281) 
As this example shows, it is useful to distinguish between conceptual and statistical 
hypotheses. In the example, there is a single conceptual hypothesis: Ambivalence will be 
positively related to subjective ambivalence. However, at the statistical level, this hypothesis 
translates into several separate tests. The CRM would be fully supported only if the 
High/High cell was found (in separate tests) to be different from the remaining cells, and the 
remaining cells  in turn were judged (in separate tests) to be equivalent in terms of subjective 
ambivalence. 
 Although ambivalence research operates differently from this simplified example in 
that it typically relies on continuous measures of P and N, current data-analytic practice 
essentially runs the same risk of misspecifying a conceptual hypothesis at the level of 
statistics. The problem arises when a single variable is constructed on the basis of an equation 
such as (1) and then used to predict another variable. This more realistic scenario is 
considered next. 
 In order to examine the conceptual hypothesis that ambivalence is positively related to 
some dependent variable (e.g., subjective ambivalence), researchers commonly estimate 
Pearson’s correlations (e.g., Holbrook & Krosnick, 2005; Priester & Petty, 1996; Riketta, 





ρ ,, = ,     (3) 
where AY ,ρ  denotes the correlation between the conceptual dependent variable Y and 
ambivalence (A) calculated according to one of several ambivalence formulae, AY ,σ  is the 
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covariance of Y and A, and Yσ  and Aσ  are the standard deviations of Y and A, respectively. 
Support for the conceptual hypothesis would be claimed if the statistical hypothesis could be 
rejected that AY ,ρ  is zero or less. However, because the ambivalence index is necessarily 
correlated with the component scores of positivity and negativity, a positive AY ,ρ  could 
simply reflect the fact that either one of the component measures is positively related to the 
dependent variable. This can be seen more clearly if we write the covariance of Y and A in 
such a way that the components of A become explicit. In order to do so, we need to 
reformulate the absolute difference expression in Equation (1) to yield a linear combination 
of P and N. The following Equation reproduces the nonlinear CRM formula on the left-hand 
side, and a mathematically equivalent expression on the right-hand side:  
))(21()(||)( NPWNPNPNP −−−+=−−+ .  (4) 
where, following Edwards (1994), W is a dummy variable that is set to 0 when P > N, 
and set to 1 when P < N, and randomly set to 1 or 0 when P = N. This preserves the qualities 
of the absolute difference (i.e., polarization) expression in Kaplan’s (1972) ambivalence 
formula, for it guarantees that the smaller value of P and N will always be subtracted from the 
larger value. Expanding (4) and simplifying yields 
  )222(||)( WNWPNNPNP −+=−−+ .  (5) 
Because the covariance of a sum is given by the sum of the covariances, the 
covariance between the dependent variable and ambivalence can be written as follows: 
WNYWPYNYAY ,,,, 222 σσσσ −+= .   (6) 
Equation (6) can be used to determine under which conditions AY ,ρ  will be positive. 
If we assume multivariate normality for Y, P, and N, and expected values of zero (which is 
tantamount to centering the variables at their means), the terms WPY ,σ  and WNY ,σ  can be 
shown to depend straightforwardly on PY ,σ  and NY ,σ , respectively. Given the above 
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assumptions, the distribution of (Y, P, N) is symmetric and thus the same as the distribution 
of . It follows that the expectation of W is equal to .5, the covariance of Y and 
WP is half the covariance of Y and P, and the covariance of Y and WN is half the covariance 















σ = ). 
Substituting these results for WPY ,σ  and WNY ,σ in (6), it becomes evident that the 
covariance between Y and A calculated according to the CRM will be positive (and therefore, 
AY ,ρ  > 0) whenever the sum of the covariances of Y with P and N, respectively, is greater 
than zero: 
NYPYAY ,,, σσσ += .    (7) 
 Since this condition can be satisfied in multiple ways, the correlation coefficient AY ,ρ  
is difficult to interpret. For instance, subjective ambivalence may be a sole function of 
negativity. In fact, positivity may even be negatively correlated with subjective ambivalence. 
All that is required for AY ,ρ  to be positive in this case would be that the absolute value of the 
covariance between subjective ambivalence and negativity is larger than the absolute value of 
the covariance between subjective ambivalence and positivity. In sum, the current data-
analytic approach does not seem to test the intended conceptual hypothesis, which 
jeopardizes the validity of the conclusions that researchers draw from their research.  
Assumptions of the SIM 
Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin (1995) argue that Kaplan’s (1972) formula does not 
match his theoretical characterization of ambivalence in terms of (high) total affect and (low) 
polarization. As we have seen, according to the CRM formula, ambivalence increases as a 
linear function of the smaller value of P and N. However, if a low degree of polarization of 
attitude components is an independent aspect of ambivalence, then the measure with the 
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higher value of P and N should also affect (i.e., decrease) the amount of ambivalence. Thus, 




− | P −N |.   (8) 
 The assumed impact of the higher value of P and N becomes apparent if we rewrite 
(8) according to Priester and Petty (1996): 
A =1.5* Min(P,N) − 0.5* Max(P,N).  (9) 
To illustrate the SIM formula, consider again the simplifying 2 × 2 table defined by 
high (e.g., 1) and low (e.g., 0) values of P and N. Like the CRM, the SIM postulates that the 
High/High cell would exhibit the highest level of ambivalence. However, the SIM does not 
assign equal status to the remaining cells. In contrast to the CRM, the Low/Low cell would 
reveal intermediate levels of ambivalence, because it is equally unpolarized as the High/High 
cell. Thus, the SIM treats what Kaplan (1972) calls indifference as a milder form of 
ambivalence, sharing the similarity of P and N, but lacking the overall intensity of affect. 
Testing the Assumptions of the SIM: Problems with the Current Approach 
Previous research on the SIM has used the same correlational strategy as research on 
the CRM, where P and N are collapsed into a single ambivalence variable that is then used to 
predict a dependent variable. Thus, in order to reveal possible confounds underlying this 
strategy, we repeat the steps from Equations (4) to (6) for the SIM. The following Equation 
reproduces the nonlinear SIM formula on the left-hand side, and a mathematically equivalent 





)( NPWNPNPNP −−−+=−−+ ,  (10) 
where W again is a dummy variable with the same meaning as before. Multiplying out 
the inner brackets and simplifying yields 
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)225.05.1(||
2
)( WNWPPNNPNP −+−=−−+ .  (11) 
Under which circumstances will AY ,ρ  be positive when ambivalence is calculated 
according to the SIM, i.e. Equation (11)? As the following equation for the covariance 
between Y and A reveals, 
σY ,A =1.5σY ,N − 0.5σY ,P + 2σY ,WP − 2σY ,WN ,  (12) 
AY ,ρ  depends on the same terms as in an analysis based on the CRM. Moreover, 
making the same distributional assumptions as above, we find that the covariance between Y 
and A will be positive (and therefore, AY ,ρ  > 0) under exactly the same circumstances as 
above, namely whenever the sum of the covariances of Y with P and N, respectively, is 







σ += .    (13) 
Thus, the conditions for a positive correlation between Y and A are identical whether 
the CRM or the SIM is used to calculate A. However, this conclusion pertains only to the sign 
and not to the size of the correlation. A comparison of Equations (7) and (13) reveals that the 
covariance between Y and A is twice as large when the CRM rather than the SIM is used to 
calculate A. In order to determine if there is any a priori difference in the size of AY ,ρ  given 
the CRM or the SIM, we need to take into account the standard deviations of the ambivalence 















CRMA .   (14) 
Thus, we can write the correlation between Y and A calculated according to the CRM 
as a function of the correlation between Y and A calculated according to the SIM: 
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= . (15) 
This means that ambivalence calculated according to the CRM is bound to correlate 
higher with a dependent variable (e.g., subjective ambivalence) than ambivalence calculated 
according to the SIM. Given the distributional assumptions we made, the CRM correlation is 
equal to 
3
4  times the SIM correlation. This analytic result contradicts previous empirical 
comparisons of the CRM and the SIM indices in terms of how well they predict subjective 
ambivalence. In previous research, the SIM index has often been found to correlate higher 
(although only slightly so) with subjective ambivalence than the CRM index (e.g., Priester & 
Petty, 1996; Riketta, 2000; Thompson et al., 1995). This discrepancy can occur because the 
assumptions we have made are unlikely to be met exactly in any given empirical study. 
Recall that we assumed a multivariate normal distribution with expected values of zero for 
the variables Y, P, and N, and in Appendix B we made the further assumption that P and N 
are statistically independent. Deviations from these assumptions can change the ratio of the 
SIM and CRM correlations. However, the important lesson to be drawn from our analytic 
results is that bivariate correlations not only fail to test the assumptions of a given 
ambivalence model, but they also fail to distinguish between divergent ambivalence models. 
It would certainly be an unfair comparison to adjudicate between the CRM and the SIM on 
the basis of bivariate correlations because the CRM index can be predicted to produce higher 
correlations than the SIM index (under plausible, if ideal conditions) before any data are 
collected.  
Overcoming Problems with Current Data-Analytic Approaches: The Multivariate 
Approach to Ambivalence Models 
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The crucial problem revealed above is that the current data-analytic approach treats 
ambivalence as a single variable, which renders statistical results ambiguous with regard to 
the validity of the conceptual hypothesis. As a result, it is difficult to tell if the CRM or the 
SIM can fit empirical data, or – equally important – if one of the models can fit the data better 
than the other (cf. Roberts & Pashler, 2000). 
In the following, we propose a new data-analytic procedure to overcome these 
difficulties. Our approach is based on a simple rule: Analyze separately what you measure 
separately! Thus, in contrast to what may be called the Univariate Approach to Ambivalence 
Models (UAAM) which prevails in the ambivalence literature, we propose a Multivariate 
Approach to Ambivalence Models (MAAM) which allows for unambiguous and competitive 
tests of and between ambivalence models. 
Analyzing the CRM with the MAAM 
In order to make the statistical hypotheses and constraints underlying the CRM 
transparent and testable, we begin with a simple linear regression 
Y = b0 + b1A+ ε ,    (16) 
where Y refers to the measured dependent variable, A refers to ambivalence calculated 
according to one of several ambivalence formulae, is the regression intercept, is the 
regression slope, and
0b 1b
ε represents the random error term. By substituting (5) for A into (16) 
and expanding (cf. Edwards, 1994), we obtain 
ε+−++= WNbWPbNbbY 1110 222 .   (17) 
 The implications of Equation (17) are more readily understood by comparing it 
against a general moderated multiple regression model with the same variables, 
complemented by the missing lower-order terms W and P that feature in the two-way 
interactions (see Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003), and the interaction between P and N 
(see Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd, 2004), 
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ε+++++++= WNbWPbPNbWbNbPbbY 6543210 . (18) 
 A comparison of Equations (17) and (18) shows that the CRM constrains the general 
equation in the following ways. First, the effects of N and the interaction term WP on Y are 
assumed to be equal ( . Second, the effects of N and the interaction term WN on Y are 
assumed to be opposite in sign but equal in absolute magnitude 
)52 bb =
)( 62 bb −= . These constraints 
reflect the model assumption that ambivalence effects are carried by the smaller component 
or conflicting reaction (P or N) regardless of valence. The model assumptions would be 
violated if either component had a stronger influence on the dependent variable than the 
other. Finally, the CRM implies that the effects of P, W, and PN should be zero 
( 0 ). Note that the hypothesized zero effect of P does not imply that P is 
irrelevant. Rather, it is due to the coding of W, which makes the coefficient associated with P 
a test of the effect of P on the outcome when P > N. According to the CRM, this effect should 
in fact be zero. 
431 === bbb
 Thus, when ambivalence is assumed to predict an outcome, we recommend that 
researchers estimate the multiple regression model shown in (18) and test the constraints 
implied by the ambivalence model. In the case of the CRM, researchers should examine (a) if 
(b) if and (c) if ,052 =− bb ,062 =+ bb 0431 === bbb , which would be required to claim 
full support for the ambivalence model. It is also essential to check the effects of single 
coefficients. For instance, if the conceptual hypothesis states a positive effect of ambivalence, 
 and  should differ from zero in a positive direction, and should differ from zero in a 
negative direction. An overview of the expected pattern of regression coefficients is 
presented in Table 1. The opposite pattern would be required if the conceptual hypothesis 
states a negative effect of ambivalence. 
2b 5b 6b
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 However, even if empirical observations were in line with the hypotheses and 
constraints of the CRM, we would merely know that the model can fit the data. To provide 
strong support for a theoretical model, it is essential to show that the data cannot be fitted by 
at least one other plausible model (cf. Roberts & Pashler, 2000). Judging by how often it has 
been applied, the SIM appears to be the most plausible alternative model. In the next section, 
we unravel the implications of the MAAM for analyzing the SIM. 
Analyzing the SIM with the MAAM 
 The statistical hypotheses and constraints of the SIM can be derived in the same way 
as for the CRM, that is, by substituting (11) for A into (16) and expanding, which yields: 
 ε+−+−+= WNbWPbPbNbbY 11110 225.05.1 .  (19) 
 By comparing (19) with the general moderated multiple regression equation (18) 
restated here, 
ε+++++++= WNbWPbPNbWbNbPbbY 6543210 ,  
 we find that the model assumptions of the SIM translate into the following statistical 
hypotheses. First, the effect of N should be three times the size of the effect of P, but opposite 
in sign ( ). Second, the effects of WP and WN should be four times the size of P, 
but with different signs ( , and  
03 21 =+ bb
04 51 =+ bb 04 61 =− bb ). Third, the effects of W and the 
interaction of P and N are assumed to be zero ( 043 == bb ). Table 1 presents an overview of 
the regression coefficients expected on the basis of the CRM and the SIM, assuming a 
positive effect of ambivalence on a dependent variable. This juxtaposition confirms our 
earlier conclusion that the CRM and the SIM make quite different predictions regarding the 
effects of P and N. In contrast to the univariate approach dominating the ambivalence 
literature, the MAAM we are proposing makes these predictions transparent and allows for 
competitive testing between the models. We will illustrate our approach in Studies 1 and 2 
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below, using the relationship between ambivalence and subjective ambivalence as an 
empirical example. 
Ambivalence as a Moderator Variable 
 The most frequently investigated (and generally corroborated) hypothesis about 
ambivalence is that it will attenuate attitude effects (e.g., Armitage & Conner, 2000; Bassili, 
1996; Brömer, 2002; Cavazza & Butera, in press; Conner, Povey, Sparks, James, & 
Shepherd, 2003; Conner, Sherlock, & Orbell, 1998; Conner et al., 2002; Costarelli & Colloca, 
in press; Dormandy et al., 2006; Moore, 1973, 1980; Povey, Wellens, & Conner, 2001; 
Sparks et al., 2001; Sparks, Harris, & Lockwood, 2004; Zemborain & Johar, 2007). In other 
words, the impact of attitudes on subsequently reported attitudes (i.e., attitude stability) or on 
cognition or behavior should decrease with increasing ambivalence (for reviews in the 
context of the Theory of Planned Behavior, see Armitage & Conner, 2004; Cooke & Sheeran, 
2004). In this section we reveal problems with the current approach to testing this hypothesis. 
 Testing a Moderator Hypothesis Based on the CRM or the SIM: Problems with the 
Current Approach 
The modal data-analytic strategy to test this moderator hypothesis is to estimate the 
interaction effect of attitude and an index of ambivalence on some dependent variable, using 
the following general moderated multiple regression equation (note that our arguments below 
would similarly apply to ANOVAs after dichotomization of ambivalence, sometimes used in 
older studies, and multi-sample structural equation models sometimes used in more recent 
studies): 
Y = b0 + b1X + b2A + b3XA+ε ,   (20) 
 where Y is the dependent variable, X is the independent variable (i.e., in our example, 
attitude), A is ambivalence calculated according to a given ambivalence model, and XA is the 
product term whose coefficient  represents the interactive effect of X and A on Y. b3
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A negative b  is typically interpreted as support for the hypothesis that ambivalence 
attenuates attitude effects. Thus, we deem it essential to understand the conditions under 
which the hypothesized negative interaction can occur, that is, when estimates of b  will be 
negative. As we demonstrate in Appendix C, a negative b  is likely to occur even if no 
interaction effect exists in the population! Furthermore, the answer to this question does not 
depend on whether the CRM or the SIM is used to calculate A. The formal proofs for this 
assertion (provided in Appendices A and C) can be summarized in conceptual terms as 
follows. First, we use a general formula for the interaction effect  and express all terms 
involving A as linear combinations of the underlying variables P, N, and the dummy variable 
W (see above). Second, we assume multivariate normality for the measured variables Y, X, P 
and N. Although all interactions of centered variables are zero under multivariate normality 
(Aiken & West, 1991), a linear expression of the ambivalence models necessitates the use of 
a dummy variable W, for which normality cannot be assumed. In order to determine the sign 
of  in the population model, we must make further assumptions. The simplest assumption 
to make in this context is that the covariances of P and X or Y are positive, and the 







NY,PY, σσ −= and NX,PX, σσ −= ). Furthermore, we assume that P and N are uncorrelated. 








>  (see 
Appendix C). This means that a moderator artifact can occur when the correlation of N and X 
is equal to the correlation of N and Y, or more generally, when the ratio of these correlations 









> , one can verify that this condition is easily met. For instance, the inequality 
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holds if X (attitude) and Y (e.g., a corresponding behavior) correlate at 3.=ρ , and N (the 
negative attitude component) correlates with X and Y at 2.−=ρ  and 1.−=ρ , respectively. 
This result is simple – but it depends on a number of assumptions we have made in 
the course of its derivation which are worth restating here. First, Y, X, P and N are 
multivariate normal with zero means and unit variances. Second, P and N are uncorrelated, 
which is a widespread theoretical assumption (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Kaplan, 1972; 
Scott, 1969) and confirmed by our own empirical results reported below. Third, the 
covariances between P and X or Y are positive, and the covariances between N and X or Y are 
negative but of the same absolute magnitude as those of P. The symmetry of the effects of P 
and N on attitude is not an assumption we made lightly. Most notably, the model of 
evaluative space by Cacioppo and colleagues (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo, 
Gardner, & Berntson, 1997) suggests a steeper activation function for negativity vs. 
positivity. However, Cacioppo and colleagues also note that the symmetry assumption is 
made by all ambivalence models (Cacioppo et al., 1997), so we considered it appropriate to 
use it in deriving the implications of two of these models. The symmetry assumption is also 
supported by the average correlations across six different samples reported in Kaplan (1972,  
p. 370) as well as our own data.  
In sum, our decomposition of  reveals three serious problems with the current 
univariate approach to testing a moderator hypothesis about ambivalence. First, a negative b  
is difficult to interpret because its conditions can be satisfied in multiple ways. Second, it 
follows that the univariate approach is unable to adjudicate between the competing 
predictions of the CRM and the SIM. Third, since a sufficient condition for a negative b  
does not include any product terms, researchers may easily interpret a moderator artifact as 




Using the MAAM to Test a Moderator Hypothesis About Ambivalence 
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 A multivariate treatment of ambivalence is necessary to circumvent the three 
problems revealed above. Therefore, we again use the rule Analyze separately what you 
measure separately! and derive the multivariate hypotheses and constraints implied by the 









.   (21) 
 Analogously substituting the SIM formula (11) into Equation (20), we obtain 









.  (22) 
 The implied constraints follow from comparisons of Equations (21) and (22) with a 
general moderated multiple regression equation, complemented by the lower-order terms and 







876543210  (23) 
 This is the multiple regression model that we suggest researchers should estimate in 
order to test for moderator effects of ambivalence. By estimating the model shown in (23), 
researchers can rule out spurious moderator effects as revealed above. Furthermore, unlike 
the UAAM, this approach allows for direct comparisons of the CRM and SIM. Table 2 
provides an overview of the expected regression coefficients given the CRM and the SIM.  
Summary and Overview of Empirical Studies 
 The discussion of ambivalence models so far has shown that current data-analytic 
procedures can produce ambiguous and misleading results under plausible assumptions. This 
alone suggests that researchers are discarding information about the validity of the reported 
effects by relying on ambivalence indices in the way discussed above. However, the 
consequences of this information loss would be less dramatic if the substantive conclusions 
about actual empirical data would remain unchanged by the proposed alternative data-
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analytic procedure. Thus, we conducted four studies to examine empirically if the Univariate 
Approach to Ambivalence Models (UAAM) does in fact lead to different conclusions than 
the proposed Multivariate Approach to Ambivalence Models (MAAM).  
All studies were conducted in the context of intergroup attitudes where ambivalence is 
assumed to play a major role. Prejudice research has long recognized the potential of 
outgroups to elicit ambivalence. Many different sources of ambivalence have been specified 
for different outgroups, including moral dilemmas (e.g., Allport, 1954, pp. 326-339; Crandall 
& Eshleman, 2003, pp. 433-434; Katz, 1981; Katz, Glass, & Wackenhut, 1986; Katz & Hass, 
1988; Myrdal, 1944) and mixed stereotype content (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; 
Glick & Fiske, 1996). However, ambivalence in intergroup contexts has never been explicitly 
addressed from an attitude strength perspective, which is perhaps due to social psychology’s 
general trend toward fragmentation (Kruglanski, 2001).  
In order to foster integration of research on attitude strength and intergroup attitudes, 
Studies 1 and 2 examine ambivalence as a predictor of subjective reports of ambivalence 
toward an outgroup. Study 3 then tests the attitude strength hypothesis that ambivalence 
would moderate the temporal stability of outgroup attitudes. Study 4 examines a hypothesis 
jointly derived from the intergroup and attitude strength literatures, namely that ambivalence 
would lead to more extreme responses to outgroup members, that is, response amplification 
(Katz et al., 1986). All four studies compare predictions of the CRM and the SIM and results 
obtained based on the UAAM and the MAAM. Finally, we present a simulation study to 
gauge the likelihood that the UAAM produces statistical artifacts that could be interpreted as 
support for a moderator hypothesis about ambivalence. 
Study 1: Ambivalence Predicting Subjective Ambivalence 
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 Our first study tested if the CRM or the SIM would better account for the relationship 
between ambivalence and subjective ambivalence in German participants’ attitudes toward 
Turks living in Germany. 
Method 
Participants 
 One-hundred and forty-four (27 male, 117 female) undergraduates from a middle-
sized German university filled out a questionnaire booklet at the end of a social psychology 
lecture in exchange for research credit points. The age range was from 18 to 29 years with a 
median of 21 years. 
Measures 
 Positivity and Negativity. We used the standard split semantic differential method 
(Kaplan, 1972) to measure positivity and negativity towards Turks in Germany. For instance, 
participants were asked to “consider only the positive qualities of Turks and ignore their 
negative ones. How positive are the positive qualities of Turks in Germany?” The unipolar 
response scale had four options: 0 (not at all positive), 1 (slightly positive), 2 (quite positive), 
3 (extremely positive). Then they were asked the corresponding question about the negative 
qualities of Turks. A second item pair referred to pleasant vs. unpleasant qualities. The order 
of positively and negatively valenced items was counterbalanced. Responses to individual 
items were averaged to obtain measures of positivity (α = .78) and negativity (α = .83) which 
were slightly positively correlated at r = .14, p = .10. Higher values indicate more positivity 
or negativity, respectively. 
 Subjective Ambivalence. Participants responded to the following three items on a scale 
from 1 (do not agree at all) to 6 (agree completely): “Regarding the issue ‘Turks in 
Germany’, I find it hard to be pro or contra”, “I have mixed feelings toward Turks in 
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Germany”, “My opinion of Turks in Germany is undecided.” Subjective ambivalence scores 
were obtained by averaging across items (α = .77). 
Results 
 In the interest of comparability with previous research, we first estimated the bivariate 
correlations between subjective ambivalence and the indices suggested by the CRM and the 
SIM, respectively. In line with previous findings (e.g., Priester & Petty, 1996; Riketta, 2000; 
Thompson et al., 1995), these correlations were highly similar in direction and size. 
Subjective ambivalence was correlated at r = .33 with the CRM-index and at r = .36 with the 
SIM index. However, as we have demonstrated above, these correlations are mute with 
regard to the validity of the conceptual hypothesis of a positive relationship of ambivalence 
with subjective ambivalence. 
In order to test the predictions of the CRM and the SIM, we estimated the moderated 
multiple regression model shown in Equation (18), using subjective ambivalence as 
dependent variable. The measures of positivity and negativity were standardized to achieve 
comparability of scale units before the dummy variable W and the product terms were 
constructed. The model explained 30 % of the variance in subjective ambivalence, F(6, 137) 
= 9.64, p < .001. The estimates of the regression coefficients along with the 95% confidence 
interval for the population value are shown on the left-hand side of Table 2.  
A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 indicates that the results are fully consistent with the 
assumptions of the CRM. Specifically, the confidence intervals of the effects of N and WP 
include only positive values, and the confidence interval of the effect of WN includes only 
negative values. As a set, these results represent a necessary condition for the validity of the 
claim of a positive effect of ambivalence on subjective ambivalence from the perspective of 
both the CRM and the SIM. However, the SIM additionally stipulates a negative effect of P, 
which is in line with the sample value we obtained but inconsistent with the confidence 
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interval which also includes positive values. At the same time, this result satisfies the first 
constraint of the CRM. In addition, the CRM constrains the effect of W to be zero. Although 
this null hypothesis cannot be rejected, considering that the associated confidence interval 
includes zero, it should be noted that the interval extends well into the positive range so that a 
larger sample size would have likely resulted in a rejection. Conceptually, the positive 
coefficient of W suggests that people with a relative excess of negativity towards Turks 
(versus positivity) report higher levels of subjective ambivalence toward Turks than people 
with a relative excess of positivity. 
Equality constraints were tested as follows. Coefficients that a model postulates to be 
equal were subtracted from another and divided by the standard error of this linear 
combination. The resulting test statistic is t-distributed with n – k – 1 degrees of freedom, 
where n is the sample size and k the number of variables in the multiple regression model 






















where w refers to the weight a coefficient is supposed to receive according the 
ambivalence model, and , , and  refer to the variances and covariance of the 
regression coefficients as can be obtained from the variance/covariance matrix that can be 
requested from most statistical software packages. For instance, the first CRM constraint 
 (see Table 1) would suggest that one take the sum of  and  with weights (1) and 
(-1). A more detailed discussion of such linear hypothesis tests can be found in Fox (1997). 
Results of our tests of the equality constraints of the CRM indicate that the effects of N and 
WP are equal, t(137) = .65, p = .52, and that the effects of N and WN sum to zero, t(137) = 
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In sum, we found support for all of the CRM’s statistical hypotheses and constraints, 
including those that are at odds with the SIM. This can be confirmed by inspecting Figure 1 
which shows three-dimensional depictions of the theoretical predictions of the CRM (top left) 
and the SIM (top right) as well as the response surface suggested by our data (bottom left). 
The empirical response surface was obtained by plotting the subjective ambivalence values 
implied by local regression fitting (see Cohen et al., 2003). This procedure allows us to 
examine the multivariate relationship between subjective ambivalence and the independent 
variables positivity and negativity without imposing any restrictions on the form of the 
relationship (except that we only modeled a polynomial fit of the first degree for the sake of 
interpretability). Note especially the lines extending from the main diagonal line connecting 
the minimum/minimum and maximum/maximum corners. According to the SIM, these lines 
should have a downward slope (see the top right panel). In the bottom-left panel, these lines 
have a slight downward slope only for increases in positivity. 
Discussion 
 Participants of Study 1 whose positive attitude components were weaker than their 
negative ones reported more ambivalence about Turks the stronger the positive components 
of their attitude toward Turks. Similarly, participants whose negative attitude components 
were weaker than their positive ones reported more ambivalence the stronger their negative 
attitude components. This pattern of results confirms the CRM which says that ambivalence 
is a sole function of the minimum of positivity and negativity, that is, the conflicting reaction. 
 In contrast, evidence for the (negative) effect of the maximum of positivity and 
negativity as predicted by the SIM was much weaker. We found only a non-significant 
negative effect of positivity for participants with a relative excess of positivity versus 
negativity toward Turks. These results suggest that the CRM explains subjective ambivalence 
better than the SIM. From a methodological perspective, Study 1 illustrates the superiority of 
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our multivariate approach over the bivariate correlations between the ambivalence index 
variables and subjective ambivalence which could not detect the violations of the 
assumptions of the SIM. 
Study 2: Ambivalence Predicting Subjective Ambivalence (Replication) 
 To assess the generalizability of the results of Study 1, we conducted a replication 
study within a different intergroup context. More specifically, we examined the mutual 
attitudes of German and Jewish adults. 
Method 
Participants  
One-hundred and seventeen (65 German, 52 Jewish) people volunteered to complete 
an internet survey about “political messages in the context of German and Jewish relations”. 
They were recruited via e-mail invitations sent by students at a large German university and a 
large university in Israel. Group membership was verified by asking participants to self-
categorize as “German”, “Jewish”, or “other” at the beginning of the survey. The age range 
was from 18 to 58 years with a median of 27 years (6 participants chose not to report their 
age). The German subsample was roughly 4 years younger than the Jewish subsample, t(109) 
= 7.05, p < .001. Seventy-six percent of participants were female. Gender composition did 
not differ across subsamples, (1) = .15, p = .84. 2χ
Measures 
 Positivity and Negativity. Positive and negative attitude components were assessed in 
the same way as in Study 1, except that we used only one item for each construct (i.e., 
positive vs. negative qualities of the outgroup) for economical reasons. Response options 
were from 1 (not at all positive/negative) to 5 (extremely positive/negative). The order of 
presentation of these items was randomly determined. Positivity and negativity were slightly 
negatively correlated at r = -.17, p = .07. 
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 Subjective ambivalence. We assessed subjective ambivalence with one Likert item “I 
have mixed feelings toward [outgroup]”. Out of the three items that we used in Study 1, this 
was the item with the highest item-total correlation and the highest face validity. The 
response scale was from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating more subjective ambivalence. 
Results 
 Bivariate correlations between subjective ambivalence and the index variables 
suggested by the CRM and the SIM were computed for comparison purposes. As in Study 1, 
these correlations were very similar, r = .37 (p < .001) for the CRM, and r = .38 (p < .001) for 
the SIM. 
 In order to test the assumptions of the CRM and the SIM, we estimated the same 
moderated multiple regression model as in Study 1. Preliminary analyses indicated that none 
of our predictor variables interacted with a dummy variable distinguishing the German from 
the Jewish subsample (all t’s < .51, all p’s > .61). It should be noted that our sample size 
afforded us relatively low power for detecting such interactions. However, our motivation 
was less to test for cross-cultural differences in and of themselves than to make sure we 
would not miss any large group differences if they existed. Thus, we dropped the group 
variable from our analyses.  
The multiple regression model explained 23% of the variance in subjective outgroup 
ambivalence, F(6, 110) = 5.43, p < .001. Compared with Study 1, this lower R2 value is 
probably attributable to the lower reliability of our single-item measures. The estimated 
regression coefficients are shown on the right-hand side of Table 3. The pattern of results was 
very similar to that obtained in Study 1. All hypotheses of the CRM found support with the 
exception of a negative effect for the term WN, the confidence interval of which extended 
slightly into the positive range. Overall, however, results again favor the CRM. The SIM’s 
prediction of a negative effect for the maximum of positivity and negativity was not 
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supported, although there was again a tendency for positivity to decrease subjective 
ambivalence for participants with an excess of positivity vs. negativity (i.e., a negative but 
non-significant ). Therefore, we proceeded to test the constraints of the CRM only. Results 
indicated that the coefficients of N and WP can be regarded as equal, t(110) = .28, p = .78, 
and that the coefficients of N and WN sum to zero, t(110) = .06, p = .95. 
1b
Discussion 
 Study 2 largely replicated the results of Study 1 in a different intergroup context. We 
found greater support for the CRM than for the SIM, which can be confirmed by inspecting 
the empirically derived response surface of the Study 2 data shown in the bottom right panel 
of Figure 1. Note again the lines extending from the main diagonal connecting the 
minimum/minimum and maximum/maximum coordinates. A slight downward slope is 
discernible only for extreme increases in positivity. 
 In sum, Studies 1 and 2 support the CRM more than the SIM and reveal the 
superiority of the MAAM over the UAAM which would have been unable to differentiate 
between the SIM and the CRM. Studies 3 and 4 will now apply the MAAM to the case of 
ambivalence as a  moderator variable. 
Study 3: Ambivalence as Moderator of Attitude Stability 
 A frequent finding in ambivalence research is the attenuating influence of 
ambivalence on attitude-behavior or attitude-intention relations (cf. Armitage & Conner, 
2004; Cooke & Sheeran, 2004). Likewise, ambivalence has been found to decrease the 
temporal stability of attitudes in such diverse domains as dieting (Armitage & Conner, 2000) 
and voting behavior (Lavine, 2001). Although the time lag between attitude measurements 
has typically been much longer in previous research, the literature on context effects in 
attitude surveys (e.g., Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwarz, 1996; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988) 
strongly suggests that attitude reports can exhibit low stability within one and the same 
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interview or questionnaire. Thus, we examined ambivalence as a moderator of the short-term 
stability of attitude reports. If such a moderator effect existed, ambivalence measures could 
be profitably included in attitude surveys to assess the stability of other attitude measures. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 The data for the present study are from a larger telephone survey project conducted in 
2005 by a middle-sized German university. A relatively long questionnaire (average duration 
= 22.6 minutes, SD = 7.85) about minority groups in Germany was administered by a 
university-based survey institute. The interviewers used a random digit dialing procedure to 
obtain a random sample of Western German adults. Out of the 599 participants initially 
willing to complete the survey, a total of N = 385 participants were of German nationality and 
answered all questions relevant to our analyses. The age range of these participants was from 
17 to 91 years with a median of 47 years. Due to a technical error, we have no records of the 
gender composition of the sample. In terms of formal education, the sample was quite 
diverse. Twenty-one percent of participants had a university or college degree, 23% had a 
school degree qualifying for university or college, and 52% had a lower school degree. 
Measures  
 Attitude toward Turks. One of the first questions of the survey was “In general, how 
sympathetic do you find Turks living in Germany?” The response options were 1 (very 
unsympathetic), 2 (rather unsympathetic), 3 (neither sympathetic nor unsympathetic), 4 
(rather sympathetic), and 5 (very sympathetic). This is our measure of outgroup attitude at 
Time 1. The same question was asked again at the end of the survey. Interviewers were 
instructed to inform participants who were suspicious of the real purpose of repeating this 
question that a data recording error had occurred during the first time. The attitude 
measurements at Time 1 and Time 2 were correlated at r = .59, p < .001. 
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 Positivity and negativity. Our measures of positivity and negativity were the same two 
items as in Study 1. The order of positively and negatively valenced items was 
counterbalanced across participants. Responses to items were averaged to obtain overall 
scores of positivity (α = .76) and negativity (α = .84) and then standardized to put them on the 
same scale. Positivity and negativity were virtually uncorrelated, r = -.06, p = .24. 
Results 
 As in Studies 1 and 2, we first used the traditional method of constructing index 
variables of ambivalence to test the moderator hypothesis. More specifically, for the CRM as 
well as the SIM, we estimated a moderated multiple regression model with attitude at Time 2 
as dependent variable and attitude at Time 1, the ambivalence index, and the product of 
attitude at Time 1 and the ambivalence index as predictor variables. Attitude at Time 1 and 
the ambivalence index were standardized before the interaction term was calculated (Cohen 
et al., 2003; Dimitruk, Schermelleh-Engel, Kelava, & Moosbrugger, in press). 
 Compared with a model containing only additive effects, the moderated multiple 
regression explained 1% (using the CRM index variable) or 2% (using the SIM index 
variable) more variance in attitude at Time 2, indicating a moderator effect, ’s(1, 381) > 
11.79, p’s < .001. As can be seen in Table 4, the coefficients were consistent with the 
hypothesis of an attenuating moderator effect of ambivalence. 
ΔF
 However, as our decomposition of this moderator effect has shown, we cannot trust 
this result. In order to actually test the predictions of the CRM and the SIM, we estimated the 
moderated multiple regression model shown in Equation (23). This model explained 44% of 
the variance in outgroup attitudes at Time 2, F(14,370), = 20.67, p < .001. Although this 
result suggests a sizeable increase in explained variance of 10% compared with the squared 
bivariate correlation between attitudes at Time 1 and Time 2 ( ), it is important to 
note that this increase is due to the inclusion of k = 13 additional predictor variables. 
34.2 =r
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Inspection of the individual coefficients of these variables indicates a complete absence of a 
moderator effect (see Table 5). More specifically, the only coefficient whose confidence 
interval does not include zero is , i.e. the unsurprising positive effect of attitude at Time 1.  1b
Thus, we found no support for the assumed moderator effect of ambivalence, which 
would have unfolded as the pattern of regression coefficients shown in Table 2, if the 
assumptions of the CRM or the SIM were true. The moderator effect previously obtained 
with the ambivalence-index variables must be considered a statistical artifact in line with our 
earlier analytic results. 
Discussion 
 In Study 3, we found a relatively low temporal stability of a single-item outgroup 
measure (r = .59) that was administered twice within one and the same telephone survey of 
approximately 20 minutes duration. Based on the attitude strength perspective we expected 
that ambivalence would moderate this attitude-attitude effect such that higher stability 
estimates would obtain for less ambivalent participants. Indeed, the UAAM would have 
supported this hypothesis. However, the MAAM we have proposed revealed the moderator 
effect to be spurious. Thus, the empirical results of Study 3 confirm that the information loss 
implied by the UAAM actually leads to different substantive conclusions than the MAAM.  
Study 4: Ambivalence as Moderator of Response Amplification 
As we noted above, research on intergroup attitudes and prejudice has often 
considered ambivalence as a cause of extreme responses toward outgroup members. 
Interestingly, the attitude strength perspective would generate exactly the same predictions as 
prejudice theory for one extensively studied intergroup phenomenon: response amplification 
among people holding ambivalent outgroup attitudes (Bell & Esses, 1997, 2002; Carver, 
Gibbons, Stephan, Glass, & Katz, 1979; Gibbons, Stephan, Stephenson, & Petty, 1980; Hass, 
Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Eisenstadt, 1991; Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Moore, 1992; Katz, 
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Cohen, & Glass, 1975; Katz et al., 1986; MacDonald & Zanna, 1998). Response 
amplification is indicated when responses to members of stigmatized groups are more 
extreme (in a positive or negative direction, depending on the situation) than responses to 
members of non-stigmatized groups (Katz et al., 1986), or equivalently, when people with 
ambivalent attitudes toward an outgroup exhibit more extreme responses to members of this 
group than people with non-ambivalent outgroup attitudes (Bell & Esses, 2002). Traditional 
explanations would focus on threat to self-esteem or guilt (Katz, Glass, Lucido, & Farber, 
1979), negative affect (Hass et al., 1992), or a motivation to reduce ambivalence (Bell & 
Esses, 2002) as mediators of the link between ambivalence and response amplification.  
In contrast, the attitude strength perspective would account for response amplification 
as follows. Ambivalent outgroup attitudes should be less accessible from memory (Bargh, 
Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Lavine, Borgida, & Sullivan, 
2000). Thus, when ambivalent people encounter an “attitudinally relevant behavioral 
opportunity” (Fazio, 1995, p.272), such as an interaction with an outgroup member, their 
attitudes will be less likely to guide their behavior than the cues inherent in the immediate 
situation. This is exactly the typical finding in the response amplification paradigm. The 
difference in responses between positively and negatively framed experimental situations is 
larger for target individuals from a stigmatized outgroup (i.e., one that is viewed in more 
ambivalent terms) or for participants with ambivalent attitudes toward the target group. 
In Study 4, we put this reasoning to an empirical test, comparing the UAAM and the 
MAAM. We predicted that differences between participants’ responses in positively and 
negatively framed situations would be larger the higher their ambivalence (cf. Bell & Esses, 
2002; MacDonald & Zanna, 1998). 
Method 
Participants and Design 
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 The sample used for the present study is a subsample of the Study 1 sample. A total of 
86 (73 female and 13 male) undergraduates participated in individual testing sessions 
conducted one to three days after Study 1. A comparison of the full sample used in Study 1 
and the reduced sample indicates that slightly more men than women dropped out of the 
sample, although this difference was not significant, (1) = 1.85, p = .20. The reduced 
sample was on average .80 years younger than the full sample, t(142) = 2.43, p < .01. We 
also checked for systematic differences in positivity and negativity between the full and the 
reduced samples but found only negligible differences, t’s(142) < .54, p’s > .59. 
2χ
 Participants were randomly assigned to read a positive (n = 49) or a negative (n = 37) 
description of a Turkish woman. 
Procedure 
 Upon their arrival in the laboratory, participants were instructed to read a short 
newspaper article about a Turkish woman filing a lawsuit and to answer a few questions 
about the woman described therein. The articles were taken from actual newspapers. In the 
positive frame condition, participants read about a Turkish woman who was denigrated by a 
TV show host who made her appear as a drug dealer (Die Zeit, 06/08/2005). The article was 
supposed to elicit sympathy towards the Turkish woman. In the negative frame condition, 
participants read about a Turkish employee of a German kindergarten who got fired because 
she celebrated Ramadan with the kindergarten children without obtaining consent from the 
parents (Oberhessische Presse, 06/06/2005). The article was supposed to elicit blame towards 
the Turkish woman. After reading the newspaper article, participants answered a few items 
about the Turkish woman and were thanked, debriefed and dismissed. 
Measures 
 The measures of positivity and negativity that we used to model ambivalence had 
been taken as part of Study 1 and are described above. Responses to the Turkish woman were 
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measured with three bipolar items with the endpoints of the 7-point response scale labeled as 
“was treated fairly” (1) and “was treated unfairly” (7), “is unsympathetic” (1) and “is 
sympathetic” (7), and “does not deserve compensation” (1) and “deserves compensation” (7). 
The internal consistency of these items was good (α = .85), so we averaged responses across 
items. 
Results 
 Preliminary analyses indicated that the two Turkish women described in the 
newspaper articles elicited positive vs. negative responses as desired. In the positive frame 
condition the responses (M = 6.04, SD = .77) were clearly more positive than in the negative 
frame condition, M = 3.63, SD = 1.03, t(84) = 12.41, p < .001. 
 As our main interest lay in a comparison of the UAAM and the MAAM, we first 
estimated the moderator effect of ambivalence based on the index variables suggested by the 
CRM and the SIM using Equation (20). In this example, X is a dummy variable coding the 
experimental condition (0 for the positive frame condition, and 1 for the negative frame 
condition). The ambivalence index variables were standardized before the product term was 
calculated.  
Compared with a model containing only additive effects ( , this moderated 
multiple regression explained 2% additional variance in responses to the Turkish woman 
(regardless of the index used), indicating a moderator effect, ’s(1, 82) > 4.29, p’s < .05. As 
can be seen in Table 6, the coefficients were consistent with the hypothesis of an attenuating 
moderator effect of ambivalence. The negative sign of the coefficient for the interaction 
suggests that the difference in responses between the positive and negative frame conditions 
increased with participants’ level of ambivalence. 
)68.2 =R
ΔF
In order to be able to compare the results of the UAAM with the MAAM, we 
estimated a moderated multiple regression model based on Equation (23). Note that the 
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coding of experimental condition X was chosen so that a negative moderator effect could be 
expected for ambivalence and Table 2 would again provide the expected pattern of regression 
coefficients given the MAAM. The full model implied by the MAAM explained 71% of the 
variance in responses to the Turkish woman, F(14,71) = 12.69, p < .001. The estimated 
regression coefficients are shown on the right-hand side of Table 5. Apart from the known 
effect of X (experimental condition), the only coefficient whose confidence interval did not 
include zero was the one associated with the product term XN. This coefficient was signed in 
accordance with the predictions of the CRM and the SIM. However, in the absence of support 
for all other hypotheses of the CRM or the SIM, this effect cannot be attributed to 
ambivalence. Rather, the effect is more appropriately interpreted as suggesting a larger 
difference in responses between positive and negative situations for participants who reported 
more negativity towards Turks. Thus, the moderator effect previously obtained with the 
ambivalence-index variables must be considered a statistical artifact in line with our earlier 
analytic results.  
Discussion 
Based on the attitude strength perspective (e.g., Petty & Krosnick, 1995) as well as 
intergroup ambivalence theory (e.g., Katz et al., 1986), we predicted that participants 
exhibiting greater outgroup ambivalence would respond more extremely to an outgroup 
member, resulting in a larger difference in evaluations between positively and negatively 
framed target persons. Whereas the UAAM would have supported our prediction, the MAAM 
revealed this moderator effect to be spurious. It is important to note the present study’s low 
statistical power to detect effects in accordance with the CRM or the SIM (which is due to the 
fact that the study was designed when we still considered the UAAM with its lower number 
of parameters a viable approach). Although we hesitate to reject the moderator hypothesis 
about ambivalence based on the present study, the pattern of results was virtually identical to 
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those obtained in Study 3. Thus, like Study 3, the present study demonstrates that conclusions 
based on the UAAM and the MAAM can differ strikingly. 
Study 5: Monte Carlo Simulation 
We have shown that the validity of conclusions based on the UAAM is seriously 
undermined by the confounding of the ambivalence indices with their components. Studies 1 
to 4 have illustrated how conclusions about actual empirical data change when the proposed 
MAAM is used. Considered together, our empirical findings may seem to cast a shadow of 
doubt on previously accepted findings in the ambivalence literature. First, it may appear 
doubtful that the SIM can explain subjective ambivalence as well as the CRM. Second, it 
may appear doubtful that ambivalence moderates attitude effects as reported in the literature 
cited above. At the same time, the studies reported here are the only studies relying on the 
MAAM, and a reinterpretation of the weight of evidence in favor of the established 
hypotheses should not be based on this limited set of studies.  
Nevertheless, we considered it important to gauge the likelihood that previous studies 
have erroneously interpreted a moderator artifact such as was obtained in Studies 3 and 4 as 
support for the theory. Therefore, we conducted Monte Carlo simulations of the moderator 
effect as it would be analyzed by the UAAM and the MAAM. These simulations allow us to 
quantify the likelihood of false positive reports. 
Method 
 We drew k = 100,000 samples with sample size n = 150 from a population in which X 
was correlated at r = .4 with P and at r = -.4 with N. All variances were set equal to one. 
Based on our own data as well as typical reports in the literature (e.g., see Cacioppo et al., 
1997; Jonas et al., 2000), P and N were assumed to be independent. Note that k was selected 
with respect to accuracy of the results, and n was selected with respect to the typical sample 
size in the literature. For simplicity, we assumed all variables to be continuous and measured 
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without error, which cannot be assumed in practice. Therefore, we chose somewhat lower 
values of the population covariances than might be expected on a theoretical basis when X 
represents attitude and P and N refer to the positive and negative attitude bases, respectively.  
For each sample, the dependent variable Y was first calculated as a linear combination 
of X, P, and N ( NPXY −+= ) which results in a variance of Y equal to 4.6. Then we added 
random errors with a mean of zero and a variance of nine times the size of the variance of Y 
(i.e., 41.4), so that a total of 11.11% of the variance of Y would on average be explained by 
X, P, and N. This value was chosen to reflect the fact that most studies reporting moderator 
effects of ambivalence have looked at dependent variables that are typically only moderately 
correlated with attitude (e.g., a corresponding behavior or attitude observed on a later 
occasion). 
 After each sample was drawn, we estimated the regression models suggested by the 
UAAM, i.e. Equation (20), using the ambivalence indices based on the CRM and the SIM, 
and the MAAM, i.e. Equation (23). We stored the vectors containing the regression estimates 
and calculated the lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval around each 
estimate. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 7 provides the results for the UAAM, including the average regression 
coefficients as well as the percentage of Type I and Type II errors. Because Y was modeled as 
an additive function of X, P and N ( ε+−+= NPXY ), the true moderator effect  is equal 
to zero and all rejections of this null hypothesis constitute Type I errors. We counted Type I 
errors by observing the number of times that the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval 
for a parameter was lower than zero. In a correctly specified model, the percentage of Type I 
errors should be around 2.5%. As can be seen in Table 7, the UAAM produces a strikingly 
inflated Type I error rate with 9.4% false rejections when the CRM index is used and 14.6% 
3b
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false rejections when the SIM index is used. Thus, the Monte Carlo simulations confirm our 
suspicion that the moderator artifacts obtained in Studies 3 and 4 can occur quite frequently, 
namely up to six times more frequently than would be expected on the basis of an alpha level 
of .05. 
In contrast, inspection of Table 8 indicates that the MAAM recovered the true effects. 
Note that the averages of all regression coefficients other than those of X, P and N are zero 
with reasonable Type I error rates. However, as a result of the increased number of estimated 
parameters, the Type II error rates for the true effects were above 90%. In light of the 
conventional levels of 20%, these values are clearly unacceptable. These results serve to 
remind us that applications of the MAAM require much larger samples than the sample size 
of n = 150 used here, which produced acceptable Type II error rates for the UAAM. 
General Discussion 
 Ambivalence is a central concept in research on intergroup relations (e.g., Katz et al., 
1986) and, more generally, within the attitude strength perspective (e.g., Petty & Krosnick, 
1995) which is applied across many psychological subdisciplines. The current surge of 
ambivalence research owes much to a minority of scholars consistently arguing for the 
theoretical independence of positive and negative attitude bases (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; 
Kaplan, 1972; Scott, 1969), and the proliferation of several models of how positivity and 
negativity combine to produce the feeling of ambivalence. Apparently, the field could not be 
better prepared to improve our understanding of the nature of ambivalence. However, the 
methodology used in previous research suffers from a set of shortcomings that undermine the 
validity of empirical conclusions that can be drawn from this research.  
The core of the problem is that previous research has tended to combine two 
theoretically and empirically independent variables (i.e., positivity and negativity) into a 
single ambivalence index, which is then subjected to further statistical analyses. It is 
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important to note that there are exceptions to this approach. Probably the most sophisticated 
and comprehensive empirical analysis of attitude ambivalence can be found in the research of 
Priester and Petty (1996), who examined subjective ambivalence as a function of the positive 
and negative attitude bases in order to derive a new ambivalence formula. However, their 
statistical analyses were based on dominant vs. conflicting reactions, that is, variables 
reflecting the minimum vs. maximum of positivity and negativity. Like the ambivalence 
indices, in fact, like any variable that is constructed on the basis of theoretically distinct 
component variables, the dominant vs. conflicting reactions confound the separate effects of 
their components. Mutatis mutandis, then, even this otherwise excellent work can be 
subsumed under what we have termed the Univariate Approach to Ambivalence Models 
(UAAM) which dominates the literature to date.  
 In the present article, we have pointed out three serious problems with the UAAM, 
focusing on the Conflicting Reactions Model (CRM, Kaplan, 1972) and the Similarity-
Intensity Model (SIM, Thompson et al., 1995) of ambivalence. First, and most generally, 
statistical relationships obtained by the UAAM are difficult to interpret because the 
ambivalence index is necessarily confounded with the separate effects of its components. For 
instance, we have demonstrated that a positive relationship between an ambivalence index 
and subjective reports of ambivalence can be obtained when the sum of the covariances of 
subjective ambivalence with positivity and negativity is larger than zero )0( PY,NY, >+σσ . 
Thus, the effect of either positivity or negativity may be solely responsible for the statistical 
estimate of a positive relationship between an ambivalence index and subjective ambivalence, 
in which case the estimate (i.e., a correlation coefficient) and the label (i.e., “effect of 
ambivalence”) would not match and the conclusion would be invalid (cf. Reichardt, 2006). In 
the same vein, the UAAM makes it difficult for researchers from different laboratories to be 
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sure if they have obtained the same results, which impedes the production of cumulative 
knowledge (e.g., via meta-analysis). 
The second problem of the UAAM follows directly from the first: The UAAM fails to 
adjudicate between mutually exclusive ambivalence models. Although the CRM and the SIM 
differ in one important aspect, research relying on multiple ambivalence indices including the 
CRM and the SIM has generally reported converging results (e.g., Jost & Burgess, 2000; 
Petty et al., 2006; Priester & Petty, 2001; Riketta, 2000; Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, Wang, & 
Hou, 2004). However, this empirical convergence is unsatisfying because the theoretical 
assumptions of the CRM and the SIM differ with regard to the influence of the dominant 
reactions. Whereas the CRM postulates that subjective ambivalence is a positive linear 
function of the minimum of positivity and negativity (i.e., the conflicting reaction), the SIM 
postulates an additional negative effect of the maximum of positivity and negativity (i.e., the 
dominant reaction) on subjective ambivalence. Consistent with previous research, our Studies 
1 and 2 have found support for both of these contradictory assumptions using the UAAM. 
Third, the UAAM can produce a moderator effect of ambivalence where none exists. 
We have examined in some detail the conditions amenable to finding a negative interaction 
effect between attitude and an ambivalence index on some outcome variable (e.g., a related 
behavior or attitude measured at a later point in time) such as has often been reported in the 
literature (Armitage & Conner, 2004; Cooke & Sheeran, 2004). With regard to the CRM and 
the SIM we have found that a sufficient condition for a negative interaction effect to occur is 
implied by positive covariances of positivity with attitude and the dependent variable and 
negative covariances of negativity with attitude and the dependent variable. Study 5 used 
Monte Carlo simulations to demonstrate that when this condition is met, Type I errors are 
seriously inflated with respect to the interaction as modeled by the UAAM. 
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All of these problems can be solved by following a simple rule, namely Analyze 
separately what you measure separately! Building on the illuminating work of Edwards 
(1994), we have proposed an alternative data-analytic approach that we have called the 
Multivariate Approach to Ambivalence Models (MAAM). The MAAM consists of 
translating the assumptions of a given ambivalence model into a multivariate pattern of 
statistical hypotheses and constraints. Our empirical studies confirm the superiority of the 
MAAM. In Studies 1 and 2, we have used the MAAM to compare the ability of the CRM and 
the SIM to explain subjective ambivalence. Across both studies, the assumptions of the CRM 
were more strongly supported than those of the SIM. Thus, unlike the UAAM, the MAAM 
can differentiate empirically between competing ambivalence models. In Studies 3 and 4, we 
have used the MAAM to test the hypothesis of a negative interaction effect between attitude 
at Time 1 and ambivalence on attitude at Time 2 (Study 3) and between positively or 
negatively framed experimental situations and ambivalence on responses to an outgroup 
member (Study 4). Whereas the UAAM would have corroborated the hypothesis, the MAAM 
revealed the interaction effect to be spurious. In Study 3, attitude at Time 2 was only 
predicted by attitude at Time 1, and in Study 4, responses to the outgroup member were only 
predicted by experimental condition and an interaction between condition and negativity.            
 In sum, our analytic as well as our empirical results strongly suggest that the MAAM 
produces more valid conclusions about the effects of ambivalence than the UAAM. 
Nevertheless, our research is limited by several features that future research may profitably 
address. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 We have confined our analyses to the CRM and the SIM of ambivalence. Although 
the CRM and the SIM represent the simplest and the most frequently applied ambivalence 
models, respectively, there are a number of competing models (for reviews, see Breckler, 
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1994; Jonas et al., 2000; Priester & Petty, 1996; Riketta, 2000; Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 
1995). It would be desirable to explicate the multivariate pattern of statistical hypotheses and 
constraints for these models as well, so that their empirical validity could be jointly tested. 
For instance, the ambivalence model by Katz and colleagues (1986) stipulates that 
ambivalence would result from a multiplicative effect of positivity and negativity. In order to 
test it against the predictions of the CRM and the SIM, one could use our Equation (23) and 
examine if the coefficient associated with the product of positivity and negativity is positive 
 and if all other coefficients are zero (which was not the case in our Studies 1 and 2). 
However, other models imply more complicated nonlinear functions that deserve a more 
detailed discussion than can be provided here. In addition to the aforementioned reviews, 
there is also a unique ambivalence model implicit in the evaluative space model (Cacioppo & 
Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo et al., 1997) briefly discussed above. Thus, a priority of future 
research should be to empirically compare the different ambivalence models more 
exhaustively. 
)0( 4 >b
 Furthermore, we only briefly discussed the issue of statistical power. To be sure, 
power estimates are always important to be able to confidently interpret null findings. 
However, two aspects of the MAAM increase the importance of power considerations. First, 
the MAAM centrally involves statistical constraints which reverse the logic of significance 
testing. Second, the number of parameters that need to be estimated is obviously larger for a 
multivariate approach. For the simulated samples of size n = 150, Study 5 has found an 
alarmingly high rate of Type II errors when examining a moderator effect. This means that 
the MAAM requires much larger samples than are typically used in psychological research. 
Future research would thus benefit from explicitly considering the size of the expected effects 
and sample size required to reject the null hypotheses associated with the full multivariate 
model. 
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 Finally, we have presented all of our analyses in terms of observed variables, 
neglecting the issue of measurement error. Whereas (random) measurement error generally 
deflates effect size estimates, the influence of measurement error on parameter estimates 
from regression models including nonlinear terms is unpredictable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
Although the MAAM achieves greater unbiasedness of the parameter estimates than the 
UAAM, there is certainly room for improving on the bias resulting from measurement error. 
Considering the nuanced mathematical predictions of the diverse ambivalence models, it 
would be especially desirable if future research would take advantage of the possibilities of 
latent nonlinear structural equation modeling (Jöreskog & Yang, 1996; Kenny & Judd, 1984; 
Klein & Moosbrugger, 2000; Klein & Muthén, in press; Marsh, Wen, & Hau, 2004), which 
seems well suited for the analysis of the kinds of multivariate models called for by the 
MAAM (for a recent review of advantages and challenges of latent nonlinear structural 
equation modeling, see Dimitruk et al., in press). 
Conclusion 
Across many areas of psychology, there has been a surge of recent research on 
ambivalence. Based on the analytic and empirical results presented in this paper, we would 
conclude that much less is known about ambivalence than the number of existing studies 
might seem to suggest. The Univariate Approach to Ambivalence Models dominating the 
literature cannot but produce ambiguous results. Nevertheless, we hope that the Multivariate 
Approach to Ambivalence Models we have proposed will be helpful in reorienting the field 
toward more conclusive tests of (and between) models of ambivalence. 
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Appendix A 
In the following, we derive all expected values and covariances involving the dummy 
variable W that are used in the main text and Appendices B and C, i.e. ,,PWσ  ,,NWσ  ,,XWPYσ  
,,XWPXσ  ,,WNWPσ  and . As explained in the text, we assume (a) that the measures X, 
Y, N and P are from a multivariate normal distribution with zero means and unit variances, 
(b) that N and P are independent, (c) that the correlations of N and P with X and Y are 
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. Note that all terms are well 
defined, since a covariance matrix is positive definite. The equality in (A1) is an equality in 
distribution, which can be easily checked by calculating the mean and covariance of both 
vectors. Note that both vectors are multivariate normal distributed. A simple consequence of 
















Using this and (A1) we can calculate 
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Finally we get 
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where we used (A1) for the second equality. The third equality is due to the linearity 
of the expectation and the independence of S,T,U and V. For the next line we used the values 
from (A2) and (A3). By the same steps we also get 
XWPX ,σ )(XXWPE=  
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Appendix B 
This Appendix derives the ratio of the standard deviations of the composite 
ambivalence variable A calculated according to the CRM and the SIM. Without any further 
assumptions, the variance of A when calculated according to the CRM and expressed as in 
Equation (5) is given by the following sum of variances and covariances: 
WNWPWNNWPNWNWPNCRMA ,,,
2222
)( 888444 σσσσσσσ −−+++= . (B1) 
Analogously, the variance of A when calculated according to the SIM and expressed 












 . (B2) 
To simplify the derivations, we assume unit variances for P and N and 
let P and N be uncorrelated 
)1( 22 == NP σσ
)0( , =NPσ . It follows that P is also uncorrelated with the product 
of W and N, and that N is also uncorrelated with the product of W and P ( 0,, == WPNWNP σσ ). 
Under the assumption of multivariate normality and expected values of zero for P and N, the 
covariances of P and N with the products of these variables and W are equal to the variances 









σσ ), see (A4). Given these assumptions, the 
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where . WNWPWNWPc ,
22 844 σσσ −+=
Because the variance of a product is given by the expectation of the square of the 
product minus the squared expectation of the product (e.g., ), we 
may use the expectations (A2) and (A4) found in Appendix A to find 
[ ] 222 )()( WPWPWP EE −=σ
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122 −== WNWP  .   (B4) 
Furthermore, (A6) in Appendix A has found the covariance of WP and WN to be 
equal to 
π4
1 , so that  
π
44 −=c .    (B5) 
Note that the results (A2), (A4), and (A6) also hold when the assumption of 
symmetric covariances of P and N with X and Y, respectively (made for other purposes of 
Appendix A), is dropped. By substituting (B5) into (B3), we find that the ratio of the standard 















CRMA ,   (B6) 
which is the expression given in the main text. 
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Appendix C 
In the following, we prove that a negative moderator effect of ambivalence (A) in the 
context of the UAAM follows from the assumption of symmetric covariances of positivity 
(P) and negativity (N) with the focal predictor (X) and the dependent variable (Y), 
respectively ( PY,NY, σσ −= and PX,NX, σσ −= ). The parameter of interest is the coefficient  
that is associated with the interaction term in the following general moderated multiple 
regression model 
b3
Y = b0 + b1X + b2A + b3XA+ε  ,   (C1) 
where A is calculated according to the CRM or the SIM as detailed in the main text. 






















= , (C2) 
 where ρ  denotes a correlation and σ  denotes a standard deviation. This rather 
unwieldy formula can be simplified at the expense of a limited set of assumptions. As before, 
we assume that Y, X, P and N follow a multivariate normal distribution with zero means and 
unit variances. Additionally, we can take advantage of our earlier result that the covariance of 
A and Y will be equal to 0 when 0)( PY,NY, =+σσ . Thus, if we assume that the covariance of 
Y and P is equal in absolute magnitude to the covariance of Y and N, but oppositely signed 
( PY,NY, σσ −= ), and likewise for the covariances involving X ( PX,NX, σσ −= ), the terms AY ,ρ  















=  .   (C3) 
Note that we may reasonably expect this simplifying assumption about symmetric 
correlations of P and N  to hold up empirically when X represents attitude measured on a 
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bipolar scale and Y is an attitudinally relevant variable (e.g., attitude measured at a later point 
in time or a corresponding behavior). Under these circumstances, we would expect a positive 
correlation between P and X or Y, and a negative correlation between N and X or Y, while 
there would be no theoretical reason to assume a difference in absolute size between these 
correlations. This line of reasoning is supported by results reported in Kaplan (1972) as well 
as our own data. 
 The numerator of the ratio defining the interaction effect  as shown in Equation 
(C3) would be zero if all the variables involved followed a multivariate normal distribution 
with zero means (Aiken & West, 1991). However, we assume only the measured variables Y, 
X, P, and N to be multivariate normal. The coefficient  cannot in general be expected to be 
zero once we introduce a new variable A which is calculated according to an ambivalence 





ρY ,XA  and ρX ,XA  in (B3) in terms of the linear combinations suggested by the 
CRM and the SIM. To recapitulate, according to the CRM, ambivalence is calculated as 
, and according the SIM, ambivalence is calculated as 
, where W is a dummy variable that is set to 0 when P > N, and 
set to 1 when P < N, and randomly set to 1 or 0 when P = N. 
WNWPNA 222 −+=
WNWPPNA 225.05.1 −+−=
 Thus, according to the CRM, the correlations involving the product term XA are given 
by 
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 Given our assumptions that Y, X, P, and N are multivariate normal with means of 
zero, the covariance between a product of any two of these variables and a third variable will 
be zero (Aiken & West, 1991), so that only the last two terms remain in the numerators of the 
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 This proves that ρY ,XA  and ρX ,XA  are invariant whether the CRM or the SIM is chosen 
to calculate A. Moreover, the last two terms can be collapsed because we defined 















= .    (C11) 
Because the sign of  depends only on the numerator of (C3), we can substitute 
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The sign of  will be negative when this expression is negative. Thus, we can restate 
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107
 ATTITUDE AMBIVALENCE 
The terms XWPY ,σ  and XWPX ,σ  have been derived in Appendix A. By substituting these 
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 Which is equivalent to 
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 Multiplying by π−  yields 
      .   (C16) YXNXNYNX ,
2
,,, σσσσ >
Because we defined NX ,σ < 0, we can divide (C16) by NX ,σ  and obtain  
YXNXNY ,,, σσσ < .    (C17) 
Recall that  in (C1) will be negative when this inequality holds. Thus, assuming that b3
10 , << YXσ  (which is an almost trivial assumption because we defined 1== YX σσ  and use 
X to index attitude and Y to index an attitudinally relevant variable) this result informs us that 

















>  because we assume unit variances. 
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Footnotes 
1. The resulting measure has been variously called “potential ambivalence” (Newby-
Clark et al., 2002), “operative ambivalence” (Bassili, 1996), or “objective ambivalence” 
(Priester & Petty, 1996). Because most of this paper is about formula-based measures of 
ambivalence, we will simply use the term “ambivalence” to refer to these measures and the 
term “subjective ambivalence” to refer to self-report measures. 
 2. Note that Priester and Petty (1996) also used more sophisticated analyses than 
merely correlation coefficients. Nevertheless, their analyses confounded the separate effects 
of positivity and negativity, which motivated our efforts to expose possible confounds and 
suggest a more viable alternative (see General Discussion). 
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Table 1 
Patterns of Regression Coefficients Implied by the Conceptual Hypothesis of a 
Positive Effect of Ambivalence According to CRM and SIM 
Coefficients Hypotheses Constraints 
 CRM SIM CRM SIM 
Pb1   < 0 = 0  
Nb2  > 0 > 0  =  13b−
Wb3    = 0 = 0 
PNb4    = 0 = 0 
WPb5  > 0 > 0 =  2b =  14b−
WNb6  < 0 < 0 = 2b−  =  14b
Note. CRM = Conflicting Reactions Model (Kaplan, 1972), SIM = Similarity Intensity Model 
(Thompson et al., 1995). P and N refer to commensurate measures of positivity and 
negativity toward the attitude object, W is a dummy variable that equals 0 when P > N, that 
equals 1 when P < N, and that is randomly set to 1 or 0 when P = N. 
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Table 2 
Patterns of Regression Coefficients Implied by the Conceptual Hypothesis of a 
Negative (Attenuating) Moderator Effect of Ambivalence According to CRM and SIM 
Coefficients Hypotheses Constraints 
 CRM SIM CRM SIM 
b4W    = 0 = 0 
b5XP   >0 = 0  
b6XN  <0 <0  =−  3b5
b7XW    = 0 = 0 
b8PN    = 0 = 0 
b9WP    = 0 = 0 
b10WN    = 0 = 0 
b11XWP  <0 <0 =  b6 =  −4b5
b12XWN  >0 >0 =−b6 =  4b5
b13XPN    = 0 = 0 
b14WPN   = 0 = 0 
Note. CRM = Conflicting Reactions Model (Kaplan, 1972), SIM = Similarity Intensity Model 
(Thompson et al., 1995). P and N refer to commensurate measures of positivity and 
negativity toward the attitude object, W is a dummy variable that equals 0 when P > N, that 
equals 1 when P < N, and that is randomly set to 1 or 0 when P = N. The variables X, P, and 
N must be included in the regression model, although the moderator hypothesis does not 
imply any specific hypotheses or constraints regarding the associated coefficients. 
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Table 3 
Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Model Predicting Subjective Ambivalence 
(Studies 1 and 2) 
Coefficients Study 1 (N = 144) Study 2 (N = 117) 
 b CI95% b CI95%
0b  3.73 (3.32, 4.13) 2.71 (2.13, 3.29) 
Pb1  -.34 (-.78, .10) -.42 (-.91, .07) 
Nb2  .87 (.52, 1.22) .69 (.27, 1.12) 
Wb3  .52 (-.03, 1.08) -.02 (-.64, .60) 
PNb4  -.01 (-.23, .21) -.05 (-.28, .19) 
WPb5  .69 (.09, 1.29) .77 (.13, 1.40) 
WNb6  -.85 (-1.50, -.19) -.68 (-1.42, .06) 
Note. P and N refer to standardized measures of positivity and negativity toward the attitude 
object, W is a dummy variable that equals 0 when P > N, that equals 1 when P < N, and that 
is randomly set to 1 or 0 when P = N, PN, WP, and WN are the products of the individual 
variables. The column labelled b contains the unstandardized regression coefficients. The 
column labelled CI95% contains the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval for 
the population regression coefficient. 
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Table 4 
Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Moderated Multiple Regression Model 
Using the Index-Variables Suggested by CRM and SIM (Study 3) 
Coefficients A = CRM index variable A = SIM index variable 
 b CI95% b CI95%
0b  3.46 (3.40, 3.53) 3.46 (3.40, 3.53) 
Xb1  .45 (.39, .52) .44 (.37, .50) 
Ab2  .03 (-.03, .10) .03 (-.03, .09) 
XAb3  -.11 (-.17, -.05) -.13 (-.18, -.07) 
Note. The dependent variable was attitude at Time 2. X = attitude at Time 1, A = ambivalence 
index calculated according to the Conflicting Reactions Model (CRM) or the Similarity 
Intensity Model (SIM), XA = product of X and A. The columns labelled b contain the 
unstandardized regression coefficients. The columns labelled CI95% contain the lower and 
upper limits of the 95% confidence interval for the population regression coefficient. 
114
 ATTITUDE AMBIVALENCE 
Table 5 
Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Multivariate Approach to Testing a 
Moderator Hypothesis About Ambivalence (Studies 3 and 4) 
Coefficients Study 3 (N = 385) Study 4 (N = 86) 
 b CI95% b CI95%
b0 3.50 (3.32, 3.67) 6.36 (5.42, 7.30) 
b1X .30 (.13, .47) -3.78 (-5.36, -2.20) 
b2P .20 (-.15, .56) -.07 (-.87, .73) 
b3N -.17 (-.55, .21) .13 (-.77, 1.04) 
b4W .04 (-.26, .34) -.42 (-1.46, .62) 
b5XP .15 (-.15, .46) .97 (-.66, 2.59) 
b6XN -.08 (-.43, .28) -1.15 (-2.16, -.14) 
b7XW .09 (-.15, .32) 1.45 (-.25, 3.14) 
b8PN -.10 (-.72, .52) -.15 (-.75, .46) 
b9WP .29 (-.24, .83) .06 (-.86, .97) 
b10WN -.25 (-.80, .30) -.40 (-1.52, .73) 
b11XWP -.13 (-.65, .39) -.94 (-2.76, .88) 
b12XWN -.07 (-.64, .51) 1.27 (-.38, 2.92) 
b13XPN -.10 (-.48, .28) .17 (-.37, .70) 
b14WPN .20 (-.58, .98) .10 (-.55, .75) 
Note. P and N refer to commensurate measures of positivity and negativity toward the 
attitude object, W is a dummy variable that equals 0 when P > N, that equals 1 when P < N, 
and that is randomly set to 1 or 0 when P = N. In Study 3, X represents attitude at Time 1, and 
the dependent variable was attitude at Time 2. In Study 4, X represents experimental 
condition (0 = positive frame, 1 = negative frame), and the dependent variable was responses 
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to a Turkish woman. The columns labelled CI95% contain the lower and upper limits of the 
95% confidence interval for the population regression coefficient. 
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Table 6 
Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Moderated Multiple Regression Model 
Using the Index-Variables Suggested by CRM and SIM (Study 4) 
Coefficients A = CRM index variable A = SIM index variable 
 b CI95% b CI95%
0b  6.04 (5.80, 6.29) 6.04 (5.80, 6.29) 
Xb1  -2.40 (-2.78, -2.03) -2.40 (-2.78, -2.03) 
Ab2  -.03 (-.27, .21) -.01 (-.25, .22) 
XAb3  -.40 (-.78, -.02) -.42 (-.80, -.03) 
Note. The dependent variable was responses to the Turkish woman. X = experimental 
condition (0 = positive frame, 1 = negative frame), A = ambivalence index calculated 
according to the Conflicting Reactions Model (CRM) or the Similarity Intensity Model 
(SIM), XA = product of X and A. The columns labelled b contain the unstandardized 
regression coefficients. The columns labelled CI95% contain the lower and upper limits of the 
95% confidence interval for the population regression coefficient. 
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Table 7 
Average Regression Coefficients and Percentage of Type I and Type II Errors Across 
100,000 Simulated Samples Using the UAAM (each n = 150)  
Coefficients A = CRM index variable A = SIM index variable 








0b  -.00   -.00   
Xb1  1.73  12.7% 1.66  16.5% 
Ab2  -.00 2.5%  -.00 2.6%  
XAb3  -.34 9.4%  -.45 14.6%  
Note. X = simulated attitude variable, A = ambivalence index calculated according to the 
Conflicting Reactions Model (CRM) or the Similarity Intensity Model (SIM), XA = product 
of X and A. See Study 5 for details. 
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Table 8 
Average Regression Coefficients and Percentage of Type I and Type II Errors Across 
100,000 Simulated Samples Using the MAAM (each n = 150)   
Coefficients b  Type I (b<0) Type II (b=0) 
b0 -.01   
b1X 1.00  91.5% 
b2P 1.01  91.0% 
b3N -1.01  91.0% 
b4W -.00 2.6%  
b5XP -.01 2.6%  
b6XN .00 2.6%  
b7XW -.00 2.5%  
b8PN .01 2.4%  
b9WP -.02 2.6%  
b10WN .01 2.4%  
b11XWP .01 2.4%  
b12XWN -.01 2.6%  
b13XPN -.01 2.4%  
b14WPN -.00 2.5%  
Note. MAAM = Multivariate Approach to Ambivalence Models. X = simulated attitude 
variable, P = simulated positivity variable, N = simulated negativity variable, W = dummy 
variable that equals 0 when P > N, that equals 1 when P < N, and that is randomly set to 1 or 
0 when P = N. See Study 5 for details.
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Theoretical response surfaces implied by the CRM and the SIM versus the 
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Final discussion and outlook 
The preceding manuscripts have dealt with the validity of interpretational statements 
about the effects of multivariate constructs. I have proposed a new approach to testing 
hypotheses about the effects of attitude ambivalence (AA) and relative ingroup 
prototypicality (RIP). This approach eliminates the threats to validity that result from the 
confounding of index variables with their components and therefore increases the validity of 
interpretational statements about the effects of these index variables. 
Compared with existing studies on the effects of RIP or AA, the benefits of the new 
approach are substantial. For instance, the empirical results associated with the multivariate 
approach presented in Manuscript #1 suggest that people’s attitudes toward outgroups depend 
on their perceptions of the outgroup’s prototypicality for a superordinate category that is 
shared with the ingroup. Yet, the construct of ingroup prototypicality does not seem to be 
necessary to explain differences in outgroup attitudes. Thus, the label ‘effect of relative 
ingroup prototypicality’ does not match the empirical pattern of results. This finding would 
have been overlooked without the multivariate approach advocated in my work, and future 
theoretical work and theory-based interventions would have been misguided.  
Likewise, the new approach solves several problems in the ambivalence literature. 
First, previous studies have failed to adequately test the assumptions of different models of 
the emergence of subjective ambivalence. Second, they have been unable to adjudicate 
between mutually exclusive models, because bivariate correlations between subjective 
ambivalence and index variables derived from different models have yielded highly similar 
results. Finally, previous studies may have reported spurious moderator effects resulting from 
the confounding of the product term with a much simpler (but unmodeled) pattern of effects 
(e.g., symmetric correlations of positivity and negativity with the independent variable and 
the dependent variable). The empirical results associated with the multivariate approach 
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presented in Manuscript #2 suggest that the Conflicting Reactions Model (CRM, Kaplan, 
1972) offers a better account of the emergence of subjective ambivalence toward an outgroup 
than the Similarity-Intensity Model (SIM, Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995). Furthermore, 
the multivariate results did not support the frequently reported moderator effect of AA on 
attitude-attitude effects (i.e., differential attitude stability) or differences between positively 
and negatively framed intergroup situations (i.e., response amplification). 
In spite of these advances in the areas of RIP and AA, the focus of my research has 
been confined to one particular type of confounds, namely the confounds resulting from 
attempts to reduce a multivariate construct to a single numerical index. In the following, I 
discuss other confounds that can arise in research on RIP and AA and sketch a strategy how 
future research can address these confounds. 
Toward a more complete understanding of the effects of RIP and AA 
As mentioned in the introduction, psychologists typically look for confounds in other 
places than index variables. Confounds are commonly associated with causal inferences and 
psychological measurement. 
Causality 
In the above manuscripts, I have treated the question of causality only superficially, 
although I have used a simple definition of validity from an article about the causal effects of 
treatments (Reichardt, 2006). In order to better understand the effects of RIP and AA, it is 
necessary to examine this definition more closely.  
According to Reichardt (2006, p. 8), a statement about an effect is “invalid when the 
numerical estimate and the label given to that estimate do not match”. Reichardt calls such 
statements “size-of-effect statements” which are the “labels” researchers give to their 
numerical estimates of effects, where “effect” is defined as the difference between two 
treatments (one of which may be a condition where the other treatment is simply absent, i.e. a 
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standard control condition). A size-of-effect statement formally reads as follows: “the size of 
the effect of treatment, Tx, for recipient, R, in setting, S, at time, T, on outcome variable, V, 
is equal to estimate, E”, or, in short, “the size of the effect for Tx, R, S, T, and V equals E.” 
(p. 8)  Reichardt’s definition of validity covers all of the threats to validity that are well-
known in the Campbellian tradition. For instance, without random assignment to treatments, 
there exists the possibility of selection differences, such that important (i.e., outcome-related) 
characteristics of recipients of one treatment differ from the characteristics of recipients of 
the other treatment. Furthermore, other aspects of a treatment might cause variation in the 
outcome variable than what the researcher believes (e.g., placebo effects instead of the active 
ingredients of a medication). Both situations would produce a “mismatch of the treatment”, 
for the label Tx would not match E. 
In lieu of treatments, I have studied continuous variables as representations of 
constructs. However, the form and meaning of the size-of-effect statement remain the same. 
For instance, it is a meaningful statement to say “the size of the effect of RIP on attitude 
toward male students, using female undergraduates, working in front of a computer 
connected to the internet, in the winter of 2005, is r = -.25”. In this statement, the construct 
RIP assumes the role of Tx. As I have shown in Manuscript #1, this statement is potentially 
invalid when RIP is represented by a single variable because the assumptions implied by the 
construct (equal-but-opposite effects of ingroup and outgroup prototypicality) cannot be 
checked. In contrast, the multivariate approach entails three size-of-effect statements, in 
which ingroup prototypicality, outgroup prototypicality, and the sum of the effects of ingroup 
and outgroup prototypicality would be substituted for Tx (note that the “sum” in the latter 
statement does not refer to an index variable, but to a hypothesis about the relative size of two 
effects). Each size-of-effect statement is potentially more valid than the single size-of-effect 
statement referring to the index of RIP. Nevertheless, the statements retain a certain level of 
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ambiguity, even if we disregard mismatches of R, S, and T (which pertain to problems of 
generalization or external validity, see Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). 
Obviously, my research participants were not randomly assigned to different levels of 
RIP. Thus, other individual differences between participants may be responsible for the 
negative effect on outgroup attitudes, creating a threat to the construct validity of the cause. 
At present, there exists no experimental evidence for the effect of (manipulated) outgroup 
prototypicality on outgroup attitude. The validity of such a size-of-effect statement depends 
on the plausibility of the following general assumptions regarding causal relations (Mill, 
1843): 1) cause and effect are distinct entities, 2) when the cause is present, the effect is also 
present (i.e., covariation of cause and effect), 3) the cause precedes the effect, 4) alternative 
explanations can be ruled out. It is important to note that I have not presented evidence for 
any of these assumptions, which means that we must hold off on any causal interpretation of 
the results presented in Manuscript #1 until these assumptions gain more plausibility through 
experimental studies – and the same is true for the results presented in Manuscript #2. One 
might argue that the second assumption is rendered plausible by the correlational results 
which revealed a positive relationship between outgroup prototypicality and outgroup 
attitude. However, this leads us to the second area where psychologists typically look for 
confounds. 
Measurement 
If the correlational results in Manuscript #1 and #2 were to be taken as support for 
Mill’s second assumption, they would have to be valid for the underlying constructs as well. 
However, analyses reported in Manuscripts #1 and #2 were done on observed variables so 
that the main methodological argument would not be blurred by unnecessary mathematical 
complexity. This means that I have ignored the relationship between constructs and measures, 
where, using the nomenclature of Edwards and Bagozzi (2000), the term measure refers to 
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the observed score on a measurement instrument (and not to the measurement instrument 
itself), and the term construct refers to the referents of researchers’ definitions of their 
constructs, that is, to an empirical phenomenon that exists independent of theory. In fact, as 
Borsboom and colleagues (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003, 2004) have 
shown, the relation between constructs and measures (i.e., validity) is also a problem of 
causal inference: “If something does not exist, then one cannot measure it. If it exists but does 
not causally produce variations in the outcomes of the measurement procedure, then one is 
either measuring nothing at all or something different altogether.” (Borsboom et al., 2004, p. 
1061) Borsboom and colleagues provide several compelling arguments against traditional 
definitions of validity in terms of convergent, divergent, or criterion correlations (see 
especially p. 1066).   
The problem of causal inference with regard to the relation between constructs and 
measures can be addressed in much the same way as the problem of causal inference with 
regard to treatment effects. We need a good theory, a design that allows for strong inferences 
regarding the theory, and appropriate statistical analyses. As noted by Borsboom and 
colleagues (Borsboom et al., 2003, 2004) and others (e.g., Michell, 1997), statistical evidence 
for unidimensionality is not enough for a measure to be considered a valid representation of a 
construct. Although I would have preferred to work with unidimensional measures of the 
constructs (i.e., measures satisfying the principle of local independence), I would not have 
gotten far (even if such measures existed), considering that it is possible to derive a 
unidimensional measure of “coin-tossing ability” (Wood, 1978). 
The important question that first has to be addressed is: how can we conceive of 
observable responses being produced by the referents of our constructs? Let us consider the 
construct of outgroup attitude, for instance. According to a famous definition of attitude, it 
refers to a “psychological tendency” that is expressed by evaluating an outgroup with some 
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degree of favor or disfavor (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). What is the referent of a “psychological 
tendency”? Upon reflection, it is clear that this definition defines its referent somewhat 
tautologically. It is what is expressed. A more workable definition is offered by Fazio (1995, 
p. 247), who defines attitudes as “an association in memory between a given object and a 
given summary evaluation of the object”. Given that valence information about objects is 
highly important in our daily lives, it is plausible that such direct object-valence associations 
exist in memory. This assumption is further supported by evidence showing that evaluative 
responses to objects can be elicited even if the objects are presented very briefly or even 
subliminally (e.g., Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). Thus, it is theoretically 
plausible that attitudes (e.g, attitude toward male students) exist independently of their 
measures (e.g., responses to the item “I enjoy the company of male students”), and that they 
are causally responsible for variation in the measures. Similar considerations and conclusions 
would apply to the constructs of positivity and negativity. 
Although it is obvious that other causes exist for variation in the measures, careful 
design choices such as random rotation of questionnaire items and balancing of items that 
require agreement or disagreement can in principle prevent systematic variation according to 
these extraneous causes. Thus, it is theoretically possible to model unidimensional latent 
variables from the observed measures of attitude, positivity, and negativity, e.g. via structural 
equation modeling. A more complicated case is presented by the constructs of prototypicality 
and subjective ambivalence. Unlike valence information, it is less plausible that 
representations of typicality and ambivalence regularly exist in memory. Rather, it is likely 
that judgments about typicality and ambivalence are constructed on the spot, that is, in the 
measurement situation itself. 
With regard to the typicality construct, I would recommend the strategy that I adopted 
in the empirical study in Manuscript #1, that is, to separate analyses by typicality dimensions 
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that can reasonably be expected to represented in memory. For instance, it is plausible that 
students have stored representations of how “dutiful” male students, female students, and 
students in general are. These different components can then be measured with multiple items 
and checked for unidimensionality. 
With regard to the subjective ambivalence construct, I do not have a clear 
recommendation in the absence of a more elaborate theory about what this construct refers to. 
Although ambivalence research necessarily assumes that people often experience subjective 
ambivalence, it is unclear if people can consistently articulate this experience (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977). Similarly, in research on person-environment fit, a comprehensive recent 
study has found that there is little agreement between the theoretical logic underlying fit 
measures and people’s actual reports of fit (Edwards, Cable, Williamson, Lambert, & Shipp, 
2006). Perhaps the subjective ambivalence construct can be discarded until a more elaborate 
theory exists. In previous studies, the main purpose of the subjective ambivalence construct 
has been to validate different ambivalence indices. In Manuscript #2, I have provided both 
analytic and empirical arguments against using these indices, so that the subjective 
ambivalence construct appears dispensable. It appears most fruitful to concentrate on the 
putative effects of ambivalence (as represented by separate measures of positivity and 
negativity) on such interesting phenomena as the stability of attitudes, resistance to 
counterarguments, and the attitude-behavior relation. 
Conclusion 
 The concepts of attitude and attitude strength are essential to understand the nature of 
the relations between members from different social groups. Thus, it is important to examine 
the validity of size-of-effect statements such as “relative ingroup prototypicality is negatively 
related to outgroup attitude” or “attitude ambivalence moderates attitude stability”. The 
multivariate approach to testing such hypotheses proposed in the present work is an important 
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first step in examining their validity. In this final discussion I have argued that a more 
complete understanding of the validity of these size-of-effect statements depends on a critical 
assessment of the assumptions of causality that pertain to the effects as well as the 
measurement of constructs involved. To the extent that future research adduces more 
conclusive evidence for the truth of these assumptions, research on intergroup relations will 
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Diese Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der Validität von Schlussfolgerungen über empirische 
sozialpsychologische Forschung zu multivariaten Konstrukten. Multivariate Konstrukte 
implizieren einen mehrdimensionalen psychologischen Raum, in dem 
Untersuchungseinheiten verortet werden. Die bisherige Forschung zu den multivariaten 
Konstrukten relative Eigengruppenprototypikalität und Einstellungsambivalenz verwendet 
häufig Indexvariablen zur Repräsentation der Konstrukte, wobei mehrere gemessene 
Variablen auf eine reduziert werden. Die vorliegende Arbeit behauptet, dass diese Praxis zu 
uninterpretierbaren und irreführenden Ergebnissen führt. Erstens bleiben die Annahmen, die 
zur Konstruktion der Indexvariablen verwendet werden, ungeprüft. Zweitens können Modelle 
mit unterschiedlichen theoretischen Annahmen nicht gegeneinander getestet werden. Drittens 
kann diese Praxis zu Scheinergebnissen und Artefakten führen. Für beide Inhaltsbereiche 
wurde ein alternativer multivariater Ansatz vorgeschlagen, der diese Probleme löst. 
Im Hinblick auf relative Eigengruppenprototypikalität wurde zunächst die 
Mehrdeutigkeit aufgezeigt, die ein statistischer Zusammenhang zwischen der entsprechenden 
Indexvariable und der Einstellung gegenüber einer Fremdgruppe beinhaltet. In einer 
empirischen Untersuchung wurde gezeigt, dass verschiedene Indexvariablen die Hypothese 
eines negativen Zusammenhangs nur scheinbar stützen (bzw. widerlegen) würden. Mit dem 
multivariaten Ansatz wurden Hinweise darauf erhalten, dass sich die Komponenten der 
Indexvariablen nicht wie theoretisch angenommen verhalten. Für den negativen 
Zusammenhang scheint allein die Variable der Fremdgruppenprototypikalität verantwortlich 
zu sein.  
Im Hinblick auf Einstellungsambivalenz wurden exemplarisch zwei verschiedene 
Modelle verglichen, die in der Literatur oft zur Konstruktion von Indexvariablen verwendet 
werden: Das Similarity-Intensity-Modell (SIM) und das Conflicting Reactions Modell 
(CRM). Es wurde analytisch gezeigt, dass bivariate Korrelationen ungeeignet sind, um diese 
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Modelle gegeneinander zu testen, da bereits a priori Korrelationen unterschiedlicher Höhe zu 
erwarten sind. In zwei empirischen Studien wurde mit dem vorgeschlagenen multivariaten 
Ansatz gezeigt, dass das CRM subjektive Ambivalenz besser erklärt als das SIM, während die 
Modelle auf der Grundlage von bivariaten Korrelationen mit Indexvariablen ununterscheidbar 
gewesen wären. Weiterhin wurde analytisch gezeigt, dass der in der Literatur zu 
Einstellungsstärke häufig berichtete Moderatoreffekt von Einstellungsambivalenz unter 
plausiblen Bedingungen ein reines Artefakt sein kann. In zwei empirischen Studien wurde 
gezeigt, dass der bisherige methodische Ansatz der Konstruktion von Indexvariablen 
tatsächlich einen Moderatoreffekt nahegelegt hätte, während der multivariate Ansatz die 
trivialen Zusammenhänge zum Vorschein bringt, die für dieses Artefakt verantwortlich sind. 
Eine Monte-Carlo Simulation wurde benutzt, um die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Fehlern erster 
Art beim Testen von Moderatorhypothesen mit Indexvariablen zu bestimmen. Hierbei zeigte 
sich eine deutlich erhöhte Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeit, was die Plausibilität einer Interpretation 
von bisher gefundenen Moderatoreffekten als Artefakte erhöht.  
Die analytischen und empirischen Ergebnisse unterstreichen die Notwendigkeit und 
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